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Particularity as Universality
The Politics of Human Rights in the European UnionAfter the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western political principles (such as human
rights, democracy, the rule of law, and liberal market economy) have come
to occupy the centre of international legal debates. For the European Union,
human rights are not only believed to constitute Europe’s much-invoked
‘common values’ and thus form the basis of its identity; they are also
believed - somewhat paradoxically - to be universally shared.
Countering the easy self-evidence attached to the universality of human
rights, Päivi Leino-Sandberg’s doctoral dissertation discusses the problems
that emerge when the universality of rights is used as a tool for particular
policies and objectives in the context of the European Union. The central
theme of her thesis is the collapse of universality the way it has been
interpreted in the EU, and its new understanding as a fragile aspiration,
calling for dialogue and wider participation.
Päivi Leino-Sandberg’s doctoral dissertation has been written at the Erik
Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights and the Department
of Public Law, University of Helsinki, within the framework of the Nordic
School in Human Rights Research.
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INTRODUCTION
The Promise
I remember hearing about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 when I
was maybe 8 years old. I think it was during United Nations day celebrations at
school, and we were looking at pictures of happy children from different parts of
the world all holding hands. However, I felt that some parts of the Declaration
did not make much sense. While the Declaration included lovely promises, no
one seemed to take them very seriously. Confused, I asked my father after school,
why it was that people in Africa were dying of hunger despite the freedom, and
the equality and all the other nice things the Declaration promised to everyone.
He said that just because the Declaration said something did not mean that those
lovely things became reality for everyone. Equality did not really mean everyone
was equal: even if all people were equally important, not everyone was equally
well off. This was a cruel world we were living in.
As naïve as this now feels, the same sense of foundational contradiction per-
sisted during my undergraduate studies. My main interest was in international
law at large: in its methods of functioning, in the players and structures and in
the language used in the various different areas of international law. However,
the academic environment (at Åbo Akademi) in which I spent those three or four
years mainly saw the raison d’être of the whole exercise of international law in pro-
moting human rights. My impression was that there was no problem that could
not be solved by adding just a bit more human rights: a new human rights docu-
ment, a monitoring body or references to decisions by international human rights
bodies. Documents that in legal terms constituted ‘soft law’ were given central
status. No matter how much I wished to believe in the promises of human rights,
the pessimist in me said they meant very little; that they would not deliver what
they promised. I was disturbed by the idea of human rights serving as the highest
paradigm for all governance, as I was taught, but then noticing how little they
actually weighed in practice. For there to be any point to the idea of human rights,
they needed to promise more than the international or domestic politics today.
Human rights needed to have a status higher than politics, and thus claim quite a
special kind of universality. At the same time, however, I was disturbed and even
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolu-
tion 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). Hereafter the UDHR.
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slightly ashamed of my own loss of faith in the ‘one solution fits all’ answer that
was being offered.
I was always fascinated by the idea of European integration, and even more
so after Finland joined the Union in 1995. However, my mainly pro-integration
and pro-Europe oriented view took a swift turn during the academic year 1997-
98, which I spent in London at the London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE). During that year, I was not only introduced to more critical ap-
proaches, but also taught to explore a wider world of differing views. Some-
thing that I discovered then, and learned to appreciate later, was that it was not
enough to be familiar with all of those views, approaches and doctrines – you
had to have an opinion and be able to justify it. For some time, I felt I was quite
against everything that had to do with the EU. It seemed that the EU was actually
a very bureaucratic and non-democratic enterprise. More particularly, I grew con-
cerned about how some of the Union’s policies, especially its agricultural policies
and developing foreign policy and defence dimension, affected my own country.
However, during the years that followed I came to realize that it was possible
to be pro-Europe and see both integration and co-operation as proper tools for
addressing some challenges or problems, but still be critical of the current EU.
One could be pro-Europe but wish to improve the EU at the same time. This is a
vision that has since then resulted in a number of articles, especially focusing on
the EU’s democratic deficit, its frustratingly slow development towards greater
openness, and its general lack of ‘legitimacy’, alongside the work on my doctoral
dissertation.2
Since my undergraduate years I have been especially interested in the EU’s
approach to human rights. The EU’s actions in that area have seemed like a prime
example of the contradiction between declared intentions and actual measures.3
While I was writing my (first) Master’s thesis I had the possibility of working at
theHuman Rights Unit of the FinnishMinistry for Foreign Affairs. Especially dur-
ing the year 1999, I had the opportunity to actually ‘be there’ when human rights
related decisions in the EU were made. During the Finnish Presidency of the
Council, I participated in a meeting of the Council Human Rights Working Group
(COHOM) in Brussels, saw the first EU Annual Report on Human Rights being
written, was present in the first EU Human Rights Forum meeting in December
1999, and participated in the writing of numerous statements, demarches and de-
clarations. I learned then that the picture was not all black and white: there were
2See e.g. “The European Central Bank and Legitimacy – Is the ECB a Modification of or an Excep-
tion to the Principle of Democracy?”, The Jean Monnet Working Papers 11/2000, Harvard Law School; Case
annotation of Case C-353/99 Council v. Heidi Hautala, 39 Common Market Law Review (2002), 621-632;
“EU:n erillisvirastot – mitä ja miksi?”, Lakimies (1/2003), 42-50; “The Wind is in the North – The First
European Ombudsman (1995-2003)”, 10(2) European Public Law (2004) 333-368 and several newspaper
articles published in Helsingin Sanomat in 2001-2005.
3Later I found an ample description of my feelings in Koskenniemi’s (who becamemy supervisor)
work. For him, “a political culture that officially insists that rights are foundational (‘inalienable’,
‘basic’), but in practice constantly finds that they are not, becomes a culture of bad faith”. Martti
Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture” in Philip Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and
Human Rights (Oxford University Press: 1999) 99-116, 100.
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many good, dedicated and intelligent people working with human rights issues
within the EU. I learned to respect their work, but also saw how difficult it was
to find good solutions. Decision-making between the (then) Fifteen was already
structurally and technically, not to speak of substantively, a highly complex ex-
ercise, in which agreement on policies, measures and objectives was difficult to
find. This had, of course, overlaps even to the Union’s actions in relation to third
states, making them unavoidably inconsistent and thus difficult to anticipate. This
was not just a question of lacking political will but a direct result of managing
human rights concerns through the world’s probably most complex structure of
governance.
When returning to the academic world, the inconsistency of Union action hit
me again. The EU really had no excuse. So after another year at LSE (2000-2001),
my mind was set on writing a thesis on how bad the EU was as a human rights
actor. How it said one thing but did something else; how inconsistent its actions
were; how badly managed even the core areas were, and how little the Union
actually achieved. I almost saw the Union’s failures as a reason for celebration –
to me, they were magnificent proof of the Union’s bad faith, especially manifested
in the way it intruded in the businesses of other countries with apparently very
little concern for setting its own house in order. In brief, my objective was to show
what a colossal failure the EU was as a human rights actor.
But when actually writing the thesis, I noticed that the problem was over-
ridingly of a more theoretical kind. The problem was not what the EU did or
did not do. Instead, the most foundational problem related to the theoretical as-
sumptions about human rights that, as the EU frequently proclaimed, inspired
its actions: that human rights were “universal, indivisible and interdependent”.4
These three principles were believed to derive from the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and were solemnly reaffirmed by the international community at
the ViennaWorld Conference on Human Rights in 1993,5 which for the EU turned
them into “the keystone of the international system for the protection of human
rights”.6 These characteristics were impossible to live out in practice — not be-
cause the EU was a bad human rights actor, but because these doctrines had in-
herent problems. As the EU relied heavily especially on the universality of human
rights, my focus moved to considering that assumption in greater detail. To what
extent was the universality of rights actually true? What was meant by univer-
4See the European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome to
Maastricht and Beyond, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parlia-
ment, Brussels 22 November 1995, COM (95) 567 final, 10-11. Since the early 1990s, the Union has
also placed much emphasis on the interdependence between human rights and development, which
is something that I explored in “European Universalism?”. Another principle invoked by the Union,
though perhaps to a somewhat more limited extent, is inalienability, which is something that I dis-
cussed especially in “A European Approach to Human Rights?”.
5See the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Hu-
man Rights on 25 June 1993, A/Conf. 157/23.
6See e.g. The European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome
to Maastricht and Beyond, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Par-
liament, Brussels 22 November 1995, COM (95) 567 final, at 10.
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sality? Was the EU’s definition widely accepted all over the world? Did human
rights really function as a commonly shared language? During the writing of the
articles I noted that the problems I initially saw as relatively minor problems relat-
ing to the implementation of rights actually grew intomajor questions of principle
that threatened the legitimacy of the Union to engage in human rights actions of
any sort. This realization is a theme running through the different parts of the
work and finally culminating in the last one, which explores whether the EU in
invoking universality as a basis for its policies is, in fact, a ‘false universal’.
This thesis is based on five separate articles, written between the winter of
2001 and the summer of 2004, that have appeared in various international and
European law publications. The topics for the articles have been chosen simply
because they were deemed interesting and problematic. They are held together
by a common theme, which consists of looking at some of the areas of European
Union action in which human rights considerations are concretized: at the level of
constitutional traditions, in relation to the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, in the
actions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in the context of granting EUmem-
bership to new countries, and in external relations, especially through invoking
human rights criteria as a condition for trade and development aid. This is not
to say that there would not be other areas in which human rights considerations
materialize – police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (included in Title
VI TEU) and EU asylum and refugee policies (Title IV EC) are good examples of
areas with significance to human rights that have been left outside this thesis.7
On a more theoretical level, the articles attempt to evaluate the ways in which the
weaknesses inherent to the characteristics of rights considered foundational both
in mainstream human rights literature and the human rights language invoked
by the Union itself affect its actions.
The wider question behind this theoretical frame is the relationship between
what is regarded as the ‘European’ (the ‘common values’, the ‘common tradi-
tions’) and what as the universal (the international human rights law). The reason
for this is simple. When European human rights declarations are explored inmore
detail, a contradiction emerges: For the Europeans (and for the Americans8), hu-
man rights derive from their own traditions, but they still constitute truly uni-
versal values. This understanding is already visible in the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), which combines elegantly the idea of human rights
as both European and universal in declaring that the ECHR “aims at securing
the universal and effective recognition and observance of the rights therein de-
clared”.9 Still, it states that the “Governments of European Countries” are “like-
7See, however, Päivi Leino, “As in a Game of Dominos? Balancing Universalism and Particular-
ism.” Review article of Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common
Market of Deflection by Gregor Noll (643 pages, Kluwer Law International 2000)” XIII Finnish Yearbook
of International Law (2002/2004), 305-321.
8For an analysis of the American understanding of universal human rights and their own heritage,
see e.g. Paul W. Kahn, “American Hegemony and International Law. Speaking Law to Power: Popular
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order”, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law
(Spring 2000) 1-18 esp. at 4-5.
9Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November
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minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and
the rule of law”.10 This seems to suggest that while the European countries have
a common heritage and have adopted a Convention together, their common en-
terprise is also in some way universal in scope or meaning. The EU has con-
tinued Europe’s traditional universalist vision, for example through its Funda-
mental Rights Charter, which proclaims that “conscious of its spiritual and moral
heritage, the Union is based on indivisible and universal values”.11 From this
there seems to be only a short step to declaring how the “original raison d’être of
the European Communities was to help building a more united Europe based on
peace and human rights”.12 As a result, it is thought, human rights serve as both
the foundation13 and inspiration14 of the European Union. But as we have learned
from history, even the universal comes with its own inclusions and exclusions.15
The question thus is, if ‘the European’ and ‘the universal’ overlap, what happens
to that which is non-European?
This thesis is a critique of the wish to construct a distinctive identity for the
Union through the rhetoric of universal human rights. It also considers the incom-
patibility between basic human rights principles and an organisation the function-
ing of which is based on the principle of enumerated powers, entailing that certain
powers are allocated to the Community or the Union for the fulfilment of certain
limited tasks while the Member States retain their sovereign powers in all other
areas. Many problems discussed in this work can be traced back to the difficulties
involved in living without a true political community at the European level. The
main interest in all articles is directed at asking who actually exercises power in
the EU and what the actual outcome of its high-sounding ideals and proclama-
tions is. Instead of relying on abstractions, I have felt that the EU should articulate
its substantive commitments more clearly, even if this might make it vulnerable
to criticism from the perspective of alternative commitments. In the background
is the crucial question of principle concerning whether the objectives we believe
are inevitably good are good when implemented in practice, and what ‘good’ in
1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953, CETS No 005) preamble.
10Ibid.
11Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted on 7 December 2000
as a political declaration, OJ [2000] C 364/1.
12Allan Rosas, “The Role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Treaty Relations
of the European Union” in Peter Baehr, Cees Flinterman and Mignon Senders (eds.), Innovation and
Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Koninklije Nederlandse Akademie
van Wetenschappen: Amsterdam, 1999) 201-209 at 201.
13See e.g. article 6(1) TEU: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
Member States.”
14See e.g. The European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome
to Maastricht and Beyond, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Par-
liament, Brussels 22 November 1995, COM (95) 567 final, 9.
15On this, see “European Universalism?” and Klaus Günther, ‘The Legacies of Injustice and Fear:
A European Approach to Human Rights and their Effects on Political Culture’ in Philip Alston et al.
(eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press: 1999) 117-144, 117.
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fact means.16 Many of these are critiques that have been invoked in the context
of critical approaches to international law,17 but I have not seen them used in the
context of the European Union.18 This silence is one of the main motivations for
writing this thesis.
This introduction has the following structure: After a brief presentation of the
main substance of the articles and the concepts and methods used, I explore the
way in which my thesis is placed in the wider framework of human rights re-
lated research. As to the more substantive results of the study, I shall present the
articles through some of their main themes. First, universality of human rights
is observed from several perspectives: in relation to the abstraction of rights that
universalism seems to rely on for its success, and in relation to the Union’s iden-
tity and self-perception. The second major theme in this work is the relationship
between human rights and politics. I then present a short update on what has
happened in the areas of my study after the conclusion and publication of the in-
dividual articles and close with some of the central conclusions and recommend-
ations of the thesis.
Articles
The articles that form the substance of this thesis can be roughly divided in two
groups. The first two papers analyze the human rights argumentation invoked
within the Union and the last two discuss the argumentation used in its external
relations. The third article has links with both groups, as it discusses the way in
which the Union’s internal reality affects its willingness to commit itself to ex-
ternal human rights monitoring arrangements.
In the first article, “A European Approach to Human Rights? Universalism Ex-
plored” [hereafter: “A European Approach to Human Rights?”],19 I started off with
the foundational argument repeatedly used by the European Union that human
rights are the common European tradition and constitute the common European
values. I looked at how fundamental rights were traditionally approached in four
EU Member States (Germany, France, the UK and Finland) and considered how
the four different rights traditions affected the practical implementation of three
thematic rights (economic and social rights, the right to life and freedom of expres-
sion). Human rights seemed to be shared by and common to these four countries
only at a very superficial level of abstract terms and concepts, thus not extending
to a real or practical single ‘tradition’.
16For a recent discussion of similar questions, see also David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue.
Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2004).
17 See e.g. David Kennedy, “My Talk at the ASIL: What is New Thinking in International Law?”, 94
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (2000) 104-125.
18On the limited effect of the critique of rights on European integration, see also Gráinne de Búrca,
“The Language of Rights and European Integration” in Jo Shaw and Gillian More (eds.), New Legal
Dynamics of the European Union. (Clarendon: Oxford, 1995) 29–54 at 30.
19Based on my LL.M. thesis written in 2000-2001 at the London School of Economics and Political
Science; published in: 71(4) Nordic Journal of International Law (2002) 455-495.
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In “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go – The Debate on the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights” [hereafter: “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go”]20 I observed the
discussion surrounding the EU Charter. My first objective was to establish a ‘field
constitution’21 and then see through a study of arguments whether the Charter
actually delivered any solutions to the challenges attached to it: functioning as
a tool of integration, as a political instrument creating legitimacy, as a basis of
competence or as a start of a constitution. It appeared that as the conditions of
discussion had not changed from those that had existed before the adoption of
the Charter, the document had little potential to contribute anything new but was
mainly a re-description of the earlier bureaucratic EU. In fact, when existing insti-
tutional arrangements were not questioned, there was no room for fundamental
changes in the system. The turn to human rights was not linked to the creation
of anything new but to the explanation and justification of what was old. As a
result, the institutional drama was replaced with apathy, making the Charter a
bureaucratic façade, just an attempt to re-describe the existing institutional power
structure.
Continuing on the issue of internal human rights policies, in “When Every Pic-
ture Tells a Story – The European Court of Justice and the Jigsaw Puzzle of External
Human Rights Competence” [hereafter: “When Every Picture Tells a Story”]22 I con-
sidered the politics of the ECJ in establishing external competence in general, and
external human rights competence, in particular. It seemed that while rights affect
competence in twoways, both limiting and extending it, the most crucial question
is who decides on their implementation. In fact, human rights as protected by the
ECJ can impinge on Member State autonomy more directly than the ECHR itself
can. As the debates within the EU take place on a very technical level mainly
surrounding the division of competencies between the EU and its Member States,
very few traces of the original characteristics of human rights can be found in the
discussion. Instead, rights turn into particular interests to be taken into consider-
ation in the political debates.
In “Rights, Rules and Democracy in the EU Enlargement Process: Between Uni-
versalism and Identity” [hereafter: “Between Universalism and Identity”]23 I set out
to explore the tension between the EU attempts to define itself through human
rights, on the one hand, and its argument that human rights are universal, on the
other. I looked at the ways in which the EU has used human rights, democracy
and the rule of law as a part of its enlargement criteria. I noted that open-ended
principles such as these are fundamentally unsuitable to be used for the purpose,
if one wishes to act in a consistent manner. Moreover, if the actual objective of the
enterprise is enlargement, then the human rights criteria cannot be implemented
without great flexibility. Thus, the malfunction did not lie in failing to implement
the standards but in defining those values as criteria in the first place. The main
20Published in: XI Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2000, published in 2003) 37-81.
21On the concept, see infra, the Section on ‘Method’.
22Published in: Jarna Petman & Jan Klabbers (eds.): Nordic Cosmopolitanism. Essays in International
Law for Martti Koskenniemi (Martinus Nijhoff / Brill Academic Publishers: The Hague, 2003) 261-290.
23Published in: 7 Austrian Review of International and European Law (2002, published in 2004) 53-90.
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concern is the lack of genuine political control over the process of acquiring mem-
bership in the Union, especially on the side of the Candidate States.
In the final article, “European Universalism? The EU and Human Rights Condi-
tionality” [hereafter: “European Universalism?”],24 I observed the Union practice
of using human rights conditionality in various areas of its external action and
invoking the universality of human rights as a justification for this practice. Vari-
ous problems immediately emerged. Human rights conditionality only seems
to apply to developing and other weak states while industrialised states are ap-
proached on a more flexible basis. There seemed to be more than one conception
of universality, and the EU’s reading was not necessarily embraced outside its
borders. While the EU’s conditionality reflected to a large extent donors’ interest
in receiving value for their money, it also gave a very arrogant impression: we
know what is best for you. On the EU side, there seemed to be very little interest
in genuine dialogue. The risk looming large was that the Union used its economic
power for interventionist purposes without necessarily contributing to positive
changes in third countries.
Concepts
This thesis is difficult to place in just one specific academic specialisation. I have
felt that I am writing first and foremost a thesis in public international law, for
the simple reason that I have always felt that I am an international lawyer. That
conception has, however, not stopped me from having a few sub-identities, just
like I feel that the wider category of international law is fully capable of hosting
several specialized areas of law, such as European Community law or interna-
tional human rights law. I thus feel that this thesis can well be a thesis in public
international law, European law and human rights law at the same time; being
one does not automatically exclude it from being something else. This thesis is
one in international law because of its theoretical framework, and because many
of the critiques presented are most commonly used in the context of international
law; and it is European law because its object (or case study, if you like) is the
European Union. But it is also a thesis in human rights law because it looks spe-
cifically at the status of human rights in the Union legal order and at the way in
which human rights argumentation is being used. In other words, this is an inter-
national law study of how commonly invoked human rights principles actually
work when they are used as tools for particular policies and objectives in the EU
context. The principle of universality has been the focus of my special interest,
and I have treated the other ‘foundational human rights principles’, especially in-
alienability and indivisibility, as parts of the same framework – after all, all three
seem closely attached and dependent on each other.25
24Forthcoming in: 24 Yearbook of European Law (2005).
25Indivisibility refers to the idea that all groups of rights (civil and political rights, economic, social
and cultural rights and the so-called third generation rights) are interdependent, equally important
and should be granted the same emphasis; inalienability again refers to the fact that “no one can de-
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At the conceptual level, the international law dimension of the thesis has con-
tributed to the choice of using the term ‘human rights’ instead of using the concept
‘fundamental rights’, which is the one more often used in national constitutional
law or in relation to rights within the Union. The EU itself uses various different
concepts,26 some of which have received particular interpretations in the Union.
More specifically, the EC Treaty establishes the four ‘fundamental freedoms’,27
and some of them have received the status of ‘fundamental rights’ in the ECJ’s jur-
isprudence.28 However, ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’ have one central
difference. While ‘human rights’ based on international human rights instruments
are generally granted to everyone within a State’s jurisdiction,29 the EU ‘funda-
mental freedoms’ do not currently apply equally for all EU citizens but are more
limited for the citizens of the new Member States.30 ‘Fundamental rights’ in the
EU originate in the general principles of law and the common constitutional tradi-
tions, and are now codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Some of these
fundamental rights only belong to the EU citizens.31 According to the Charter, the
rights included in it should have the same “meaning and scope” as the human
rights and fundamental freedoms included in the European Convention on Hu-
prive anybody of these rights and nobody can renounce these rights by himself”. SeeMarek Piechow-
iak, ”What Are Human Rights? The Concept of Human Rights and Their Extra-Legal Justification” in
Raija Hanski and Markku Suksi (eds.), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights.
A Textbook (Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University: Turku/Åbo, 1997) 3-14 at 6. The
interdependence between human rights and development has also been central to the Union’s human
rights doctrine. For further discussion, see “European Universalism?”.
26E.g. articles 177 EC and 181a EC on development cooperation and economic, financial and tech-
nical cooperation with third countries speak about ”human rights and fundamental freedoms”, as
does article 11 TEU on the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article 6 TEU es-
tablishes that the Union is founded, i.e. on the “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”
but that the “Union shall respect fundamental rights”.
27The position of fundamental freedoms has been further clarified by the ECJ, see e.g. Case C-55/94
Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, ECR [1995] I-4165, para
37.
28See e.g. Case 222/86 Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionelles du football
(Unectef) v. Georges Heylens and others, ECR [1987] 4097, in which the Court argued that “free access
to employment is a fundamental right, which the Treaty confers individually on each worker in the
Community” (at para 14.)
29See e.g article 1 ECHR.
30For the first two years after the accession of the Central and Eastern European States, the access
of their citizens to the labour markets of the old Member States depends on the national legislation
and policies of the latter, and possible bilateral agreements. There are no restrictions for workers
from Cyprus, and the Treaty with Malta only includes the possibility of invoking a safeguard clause.
After two years, the Commission drafts a report, on the basis of which the Council will review the
functioning of the transitional arrangements. Transitional arrangements cannot extend beyond an
absolute maximum of seven years. On this, see the Commission information sheet “Free movement
of workers to and from the new Member States – How will it work in practice?” directed at new EU
Citizens, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/free_movement/docs/
pr_en.pdf, last visited on 28 March 2005.
31While the Charter generally speaks of rights belonging to “everyone”, some of the rights are only
given to EU citizens, such as the rights to freedom of movement and diplomatic protection. Some
citizenship rights also belong to those non-citizens residing legally in an EUMember State, such as ac-
cess to documents, the right to refer to the European Ombudsman or the right to petition the European
Parliament. “The Citizen’s Rights” are included in Chapter V of the Charter.
24 Introduction
man Rights, the fundamental rights established by national constitutions, and hu-
man rights protected by the international human rights instruments that all Mem-
ber States have ratified.32 The Charter (and more recently, the Constitution for
Europe) thus gives the impression that there is no substantive difference between
‘fundamental rights’ and ‘human rights’ in the EU. In its external relations, again,
the Union speaks about ‘human rights’. To avoid further confusion, I have opted
for the term ‘human rights’ in all five articles irrespective of which area of action
forms their object of study. With the term, I mainly refer to rights that can be
found in international human rights instruments, especially the ECHR.
Furthermore, I have sometimes used the concept ‘human rights’ as a cover
term for the whole EU slogan of ‘human rights, democracy, the rule of law and
good governance’. After all, democracy is usually defined as a combination of
some political rights.33 As a result, “[i]n today’s human rights discourse, demo-
cracy and human rights appear as Siamese twins: they seem not only to presup-
pose each other but also to be genuinely intertwined”,34 because a democratic
state is seen as a “precondition for the exercise of human rights”.35 Similar kinds
of definitions, based on rights found in the major human rights conventions, can
be found for the rule of law and for good governance,36 which has justified the
use of the concept ‘human rights’ as a practical short-hand for all of them.
When following the press today one notes that the practice of distinguishing
between the European Union and the European Community is very limited: the
EU is most often referred to as the relevant actor. The same practice is also spread-
ing among the academics. For a lawyer, however, the choice of player is a relev-
ant one, for it relates questions of legal basis, the role of different institutions, as
well as the scope of review exercised by the European Court of Justice, to name a
few. In most areas of my research, the relevant actor has been the European Com-
munity. The enlargement forms the main exception to this, as countries apply
for membership in the Union, not in the Community.37 In external relations the
situation is more complex: in the area of common commercial policy and develop-
32See the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310, articles II-112 and II-113.
33Such rights would probably include the right to political participation and the right to vote, with
democracy understood as the right of all citizens to participate in the political life of their societies.
From these follows even the right to hold the decision-makers accountable through a possibility of
not renewing a mandate in the next elections and this way require changes in the policy through
periodic elections. See also Päivi Leino, “The European Central Bank and Legitimacy – Is the ECB
a Modification of or an Exception to the Principle of Democracy?”, The Jean Monnet Working Papers
11/2000, Harvard Law School.
34Allan Rosas, “Democracy and Human Rights” in Allan Rosas and Jan Helgesen (eds.), Human
Rights in a Changing East-West Perspective (Pinter Publishers: London and New York, 1990) 17-57 at 17.
35Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament. Democratisation, the rule of law, re-
spect for human rights and good governance: the challenges of the partnership between the European
Union and the ACP States, 12 March 1998 COM (98)146, at 5.
36See e.g. Samuli Seppänen, Good Governance in International Law, The Erik Castrén Institute Re-
search Reports (13/2003), 4-5, 23.
37See art 49(1) TEU: “Any European State which respects the principles set out in article 6(1) may
apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parlia-
ment, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.”
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ment policy, for example, the relevant actor is usually the European Community
while one ought to speak of the Union when describing foreign policy actions.38
The pattern is further complicated by the fact that in many sources cited refer-
ence is made to the Union, even if it occasionally would be legally more correct to
speak of the Community. I have usually attempted to make a distinction between
the European Community and the European Union as actors, because in the legal
sense, they so far still remain two separate entities.39
Method
My writing has not been preceded by any very conscious choice of method. In-
stead, I feel that the method has chosen itself as a result of considering the task
and materials at hand. Consequently, I have used different methods for different
part of the thesis – something that is possible when not writing a monograph.
In the first article, “A European Approach to Human Rights?”, my approach was
mainly comparative. I was impressed by a lecture I heard in November 2000 at
King’s College, London, by Professor Pierre Legrand40 who argued that diversity
was one of the defining characteristics of Europe, which made understanding dif-
ferent legal cultures crucial. The differences should not be denied, which in my
view was something that was often risked when Europe was defined by reference
to ‘common values’ or ‘common traditions’. Instead, Legrand argued, ‘Europe’
was to be seen at once both as a universal and a particular. In the article, I did
not aim at identifying best laws and practices. Instead, I observed that there are
considerable differences in the fundamental and human rights traditions in dif-
ferent Member States and in their understanding of what should be done at the
European level. In fact, the reference to ‘common traditions’ undermines the rich-
ness of human rights traditions and cultures that exist in Europe.
The next article, “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go”, was initially commis-
sioned by the Finnish Yearbook of International Law to complement a series of
articles on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. When starting to write the pa-
per I sat with several thick files full of academic writing describing the Charter,
feeling that the discussion was completely uninteresting; in fact, in reading the
articles I felt I had learned nothing I had not heard already before. So what could
38For discussion concerning the status of the European Union under international law, see Päivi
Leino, “As in a Game of Dominos? Balancing Universalism and Particularism.” Review article of
“Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection” by
Gregor Noll (643 pages, Kluwer Law International: 2000), XIII Finnish Yearbook of International Law
(2002/2004) 305-321 at 308-311.
39This difference will, however, be history if the Constitution for Europe enters into force in its
current form. See article IV-438(1) of the Constitution, entitled “Succession and legal continuity”: “The
European Union established by this Treaty shall be the successor to the European Union established
by the Treaty on European Union and to the European Community.”
40Pierre Legrand, “Comparativists and European Legal Integration”, public lecture at the Centre of
European Law at King’s College, London, 22 November 2000. Legrand has written on the same topic
e.g. in Pierre Legrand, “European Legal Systems Are Not Converging” 45 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly (1996) 52-81.
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I write that would somehow contribute to the discussion? I explained the set-
ting to my supervisor, who encouraged me to grasp my intuition and find out
why the discussion felt so uninteresting by using the concept of a ‘field constitu-
tion’. Koskenniemi had used the same concept to describe the language of rights
used to structure the relevant social field so as to attain particular normative con-
clusions.41 According to Koskenniemi, such a choice of language forms a prior
political decision, which finally leads to a choice of which authority should have
the competence to deal with the matter.42 Focusing on the choice of language
as the key moment at which both procedural and substantive political priorities
are set,43 the method resembled that developed by Foucault (from whom in fact,
it had been received), for whom, too, ‘discourse’ was prior to politics, and who
wanted to study it in order to
know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determ-
ined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their
practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them.
In short, I tried to explore scientific discourse not from the point of view of
the individuals who are speaking, not from the point of view of the formal
structures of what they are saying, but from the point of view of the rules that
come into play in the very existence of such discourse[. . . ].44
I understood this statement as an encouragement to study the arguments used in
a particular discussion, as the reasons for using (or not using) them might in fact
be more interesting than what was actually being said. In the current situation
this seemed to suggest that the Charter discourse of rights mainly appeared to
strengthen the competence of old players and buttress the role of old themes and
their limitations. This would explain why the whole discussion was so uninterest-
ing: it had no potential to change Europe. It simply reinforced earlier evaluations
and institutional choices.
In order to test the thesis, my first task was to constitute the field of discussion
by identifying its limits and dominating themes. I did this by roughly sketching
the discussion on human rights in the EU preceding the adoption of the Charter.
Then I set out to consider whether the recent discussion stayedwithin the ‘field’ or
stepped outside of it, breaking new ground. I concluded that the specific themes
presented in the article all tended to prioritize a specific practice, which gave the
last word in rights protection to the ECJ. This was the same situation as before
41See Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture” in Philip Alston et al. (eds.),
The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press: 1999) 99-116, 106.
42Ibid.
43See also Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument
(Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company: Helsinki, 1989), at XXI-XXII.
44SeeMichel Foucault, The Order of Things – An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Tavistock/ Rout-
ledge, London 1970/2004), xiv. Foucault continues, “I am concerned, in short, with a history of resemb-
lance: on what conditions was Classical thought able to reflect relations of similarity or equivalence
between things, relations that would provide a foundation and a justification for their words, their
classifications, their systems of exchange?” Ibid., xxvi.
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the Charter discourse: the terms of the discussion concerning the Charter were
the same as those during the discussion preceding its adoption. Interestingly,
there was no attempt to move the focus anywhere else or question the locus of
institutional power. The months I had spent in the Foreign Ministry had shown
that in real life situations the set of possible options was often very limited, not
least because common views were few and hard to find. But as an academic,
I felt that this method enabled me to serve the true academic function: criticise
politicians for their restricted views and encourage inventive solutions that could
be found just outside the ordinary vocabulary.
Thismethod broughtme closer (although not as a result of a determined choice
at the time) to the methods used in “new thinking” in international law, in which
international law is described as a language, or as a “group of people sharing pro-
fessional tools and expertise, as well as a sensibility, viewpoint, and mission”.45 If
the object of research is defined in that manner, then the research itself naturally
turns into an analysis of the arguments used. If European law, for example, were
to be defined as the language of European lawyers and the common culture that
they share, then a full mastery of it would consist of being able to quote every
single ECJ decision ever, every piece of secondary legislation, knowing Treaty
articles by number (both pre- and post- Amsterdam) and also being able to cite
Jean Monnet or Robert Schuman on the objectives of the particular articles, not
to mention knowing which delegations had proposed which amendments in any
intergovernmental conference since the 1950s. This was the culture that I met at
the European law conferences I had attended.46 My own feeling of my work had
all the time been that I wished to write something different – I was more inter-
ested in the big picture. Still, I felt that in order to appear as a credible participant
towards EU lawyers I needed to demonstrate that I was fully capable of writing
a paper that dealt with concerns shared also in more traditional EU law analyses.
As a result of these deliberations, “When Every Picture Tells a Story” is from ameth-
odological point-of-view written by relying on more conventional European law
research methods. This article seemed to provide a good opportunity for that, be-
cause its object was the European Court of Justice itself. So the beginning of the
paper is, if you will, an attempt to join in speaking the same language as the rest
of the European lawyers. I felt that despite some benefits I had observed, it was
not always enough to observe the discussion from outside – I wished to be part
of it as well, and this I could do only by sharing the language. Besides, one can
usually only meaningfully ‘step outside’ the discourse and comment once one has
mastered the professional language.
Nevertheless, when writing “When Every Picture Tells a Story”, I was also temp-
ted by the difference in the language and motivations used by the two European
45See David Kennedy, “My Talk at the ASIL: What Is New Thinking in International Law?”, 94
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (2000) 104-125 at 104.
46The most important one of these was the Common Market Law Review 40th Anniversary Con-
ference, held in Leiden, 30-31 October, 2003. Only past authors of the journal had been invited, which
secured the presence of quite an authoritative crowd. But there were even several others that I had
attended, especially during my two years in London.
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courts, the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights, which despite invok-
ing the same concepts and the same sources seemed to represent different schools
of thought when it came to the effect granted to human rights. I was conscious
of the fact that for reasons of time and scope I could not possibly develop the
study into a full-scale analysis of the differences between the two courts. Instead
of writing on one of the cases in which the two courts have interpreted the same
facts with reference to their own agendas, mandates, and objectives, thus com-
ing to contradictory conclusions,47 I set out to explore the way in which the ECJ
had developed the external relations competence of the Community and how its
approach seemed to differ from its general line of interpretation in the case of
human rights. When I reflected on this against the more human rights friendly
interpretation of the European Court on Human Rights, especially in relation to
its doctrine of positive obligations, it seemed that in the EU, human rights were
just one of many factors to be taken into consideration when balancing interests.
Surely, all human rights jurisprudence involves balancing between different hu-
man rights and other interests. But in the context of ‘real’ human rights jurispru-
dence it is believed that such balancing should take place within the human rights
paradigm itself, and can never lead into a violation of human rights. However,
in the EU, the paradigm within which human rights arguments are balanced is
not constructed by human rights but by questions relating to supremacy of EU
law, division of competence and institutional politics, among other things. It was
especially through this article that I attempted to demonstrate the difficulties in-
volved in defending the principle of universality in a construction (the EU) that is
supposedly based on the exercise of specifically allocated powers only.
After these experiments, as I started working on “Between Universalism and
Identity”, my method became more clearly critical. I had spent some weeks read-
ing the Commission’s Regular Reports on the Candidate Countries,48 especially
the section on ‘political criteria’. My impressionwas that the information provided
there was reliable and that the quality of the reports was better than I had pess-
imistically anticipated. The problem was that the contents of the reports did not
seem to match their conclusions. It seemed that within all the areas of concern for
the purposes of my study, the pattern of arguments was exactly the same. First,
the EU underlined the importance of human rights related values, which justi-
fied their position in guiding the enlargement. In fact, enlargement to countries
that did not respect human rights was impossible.49 Then followed a section in
which problems relating to the implementation of those values by the Candid-
47One example of this would be the much-discussed Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children Ireland Limited (SPUC) v. Grogan, [1991] ECR I-4685; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman
v. Ireland, Series A 246-A 1-81.
48All the reports are available on the Commission enlargement website, http://www.europa.eu.
int/comm/enlargement/candidate.htm, last visited on 3 January 2005.
49See e.g. the Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, “To-
wards a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones”; European Parliament
resolution on the enlargement of the European Union, B5-0538/ 2001; A. Diamantopoulou, European
Commissioner responsible for employment and social affairs, “The European Social Model and En-
largement”, seminar speech, Istanbul 23 June 2000, SPEECH/00/235, 2.
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ate State were analysed: I learned about violence in prisons and by police offi-
cials, trafficking in human beings, judges requiring bribes in order to give a ruling
and other serious deficiencies in the judiciary, problems with the implementation
of minority rights and violations of the rights of the child, to name a few, all of
which appeared to me like very serious violations indeed. In the concluding sec-
tion, however, the reports seemed to take a slight turn in their approach, as the
Commission then simply explained all criteria to be satisfied. Despite the seri-
ous human rights related problems described, the accounts tended to end with
the following sentence: The Candidate Country “fulfils the Copenhagen political
criteria”.50
Had I followed a more traditional human rights research method I probably
would have set out to analyse the contents of the EU reports in light of interna-
tional human rights reports – what were the human rights problems of the Can-
didate States really like, and what kind of resolutions had the international hu-
man rights organs adopted? An EU lawyer, again, would have been most likely
to analyse the EU criteria and the Commission documents in the greatest detail,
ending with a critical but matter of fact remark pointing at the inconsistency of the
Union’s policy decisions. Formy part, I felt that exploringwhethermy impression
of the way in which arguments worked in the EU enlargement-related language
was correct or not would offer a much more interesting point of departure.
The arguments relating to the political enlargement criteria seemed to follow
the following pattern (“basic paradox”):
Interdeterminate Determinate
positive
Open− ended Controlling
Manipulable Exclusive
negative
In principle, I argued, membership criteria could be either indeterminate or de-
terminate; they could either be flexible and be used on a case-by-case basis or
actually guide the enlargement process. The starting point in this case was a de-
terminate one: human rights were to control enlargement and respect for them
served as an absolute precondition of membership. However, I noted, were the
Union to follow the same path to the end and take a strict view on human rights
violations, the end-result would be exclusion: strict criteria would not enable the
‘unification of Europe’. This was problematic, because the promise of member-
ship had already been given: the result of the monitoring process was clear even
before it had started. In order to attain that objective, flexibility was required:
the Union would need to have the choice of deciding in which cases the criteria
would need to be satisfied and in which cases not. However, this simultaneously
50See e.g. the Commission report on Estonia, 13 October 1999, at 16.
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entailed that human rights arguments were actually not decisive in the process;
instead, they were but one of the aspects to be adjusted to the greater objective of
enabling accession by the Central and Eastern European States. Thus, the criteria
needed to be open-ended. But this meant that they risked to be easily manipulable
in view of whatever political agendas the Commission or any other author might
have.
I set out to test my thesis with the materials at hand relating to human rights
and the position of law and democracy in the process, especially based on the
Commission reports. The political criteria were very open-ended indeed, which
had the benefit of enabling inclusion: the criteria did not provide obstacles to the
enlargement. For the Union, this provided much-needed flexibility. But some-
thing that seemed to come with the package was the making of political bargains
that had nothing to do with the actual standards or the objectives they were be-
lieved to serve. In other words, the more inclusion you wished to attain, the less
the human rights concerns could be taken seriously, showing how the “principle
of a Union open to European States”51 was fundamentally incompatible with the
idea of making enlargement conditional on the strict fulfilment of certain well-
defined criteria.
When starting to write the final article, “European Universality?”, my objective
was to finally address the claim of universality that the EU was invoking in rela-
tion to third countries. My general impression at the time was that while the EU
was invoking its highly interventionist policies and justifying themwith reference
to universality, their implementation was badly managed. In fact, my general in-
tuition (based on very limited research) was that while I had heard much about
money being spent and policies being in place, I had never really seen any veri-
fiable results for these policies. As I had learned from “Between Universalism and
Identity”, using open-ended concepts like human rights as a basis of conditionality
and criteria led to problems of definition, because success in their implementation
was difficult to measure with sufficient precision. In addition, as an international
lawyer, I felt that the EU claims relating to universality seemed unsustainable
in the light of international law. Thus, the EU should assume less and check its
prerogatives, references and foundations better.
In this article, my interest was mainly directed at the EU’s claim of univer-
sality: what did it mean by claiming this? I wished to show how open-ended its
claim was through demonstrating some of the things the EUmight mean by refer-
ring to universality. The variety of possible meanings showed that the EUwas not
only indeterminate in its claim – this lack of definition made it difficult for other
countries to know what the Union meant by its conditions, which placed them in
a subordinate position. At the same time, open-ended criteria often seemed easy
for third states to accept because they left the possibility for all parties to interpret
them in their own way. What then, however, was important was the method of
measuring their implementation: how was it decided which one of these possible
51See the Conclusions of the Presidency at the European Council in Lisbon, 26 and 27 June 1992,
Section on Enlargement, para A.
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interpretations was the ‘correct’ one? I then analysed the EU policies against the
background of some of the critiques of universality that I had studied. My argu-
ment was that if it were shown that the EU was mainly using these open-ended
concepts to push through its own readings, it was in fact appearing as a ‘false’
universal.
This Thesis and General Human Rights Research
When introducing a doctoral thesis, it is common to show how it relates to the
wider disciplinary research environment. I have chosen to do this in relation to
general human rights related research (instead of, for example, in relation to inter-
national law or European law at large). That task has felt both most challenging
and most inspiring, not least because when writing this thesis, I have needed to
evaluate and re-evaluate my relationship to the mainstream human rights move-
ment52 several times. The same applies to my own professional identity – am I
first and foremost a ‘human rights lawyer’, an ‘international lawyer’ or perhaps
a ‘European lawyer’? Perhaps all three at the same time? Are such classifica-
tions at all important? If I define myself as a human rights lawyer, how about
my objectives, methods and interests; is it not in fact so that in questioning the
current regime, I am questioning the whole objective of protecting human rights?
Is it possible to share the commitment without sharing the belief?53 More spe-
cifically, I have wondered, is it acceptable to believe in the objectives of the hu-
manitarian mission while simultaneously questioning the means it uses and the
process through which humanitarian goals are sought – the sometimes black and
white world picture, the language used, the frame of reference? Does questioning
unavoidably lead you to nihilism?
I am of course not the first one to question the language of human rights: dis-
cussion has been going on at least since the 18th century, for example about the
abstract universalism of rights theory, the individualism of rights, the relation-
ship between the individual and the community, the oversimplifications invoked
by human rights theory and the position of natural law.54 My first real contact
to more critical approaches to human rights came through Professor Christine
Chinkin at LSE, who of course is known for her work in the area of feminist cri-
52Steiner and Alston define the ‘human rights movement’ in perhaps today’s most authoritative
collection of texts and materials on human rights as “including governmental, intergovernmental as
well as non-governmental developments in human rights since 1945”. See Henry J. Steiner and Philip
Alston, International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Morals. Text and Materials (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 1996), Preface.
53For thoughts going in the same direction, see Jeremy Waldron: ”Nonsense upon Stilts? – a reply”
in JeremyWaldron (ed.), ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’. Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen:
London and New York, 1987) 155-209 at 165.
54 The sources on these topics are numerous, but see e.g. Jeremy Waldron: “Natural rights in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’. Bentham, Burke
and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen: London and New York, 1987) 7-25; Costas Douzinas, The
End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2000); Jack Donnelly Universal
Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edition, Cornell University Press: 2003).
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tiques to international law and human rights,55 but who also was the first one to
introduce me to the ‘Helsinki school of international law’ (even though not us-
ing that name) by making me read Koskenniemi’s “The Politics of International
Law”56 as a part of compulsory course readings. Whenmoving toHelsinki in 2001
I suddenly found a great many researchers with ideas and thoughts moving in the
same direction as my own. Questioning was no longer unpopular but was met as
an intellectually interesting challenge worthy of support. During the writing of
this thesis, I have not met anyone with a project identical to my own. However,
I have had the opportunity of discussing with people that have had similar con-
cerns and questions. While the writing of this thesis has definitely been more of
a solitary than group project, I have been thankful for the existence of the group
somewhere in the background.
However, in presenting bits of this work at seminars outside Helsinki I have
met arguments about how this research might just turn into general scepticism,
which undermines the whole human rights project; how it is very easy to criticise
but more difficult to work out actual suggestions; how there is nothing new in
claiming that human rights are just about politics and that there is inconsistency
in implementing human rights. All of these are, of course, valuable and valid
concerns. But criticizing is in no way incompatible with the belief that “the in-
ternational human rights movement has done a great deal of good”.57 Grappling
with similar questions, Douzinas found that “for many, to question human rights
is to side with the inhuman, the anti-human and the evil”.58 However, he argues,
even if human rights had turned into the “realised myth of postmodern societies,
their history demands that we re-assess their promise [. . . ]”.59 After all, it is also
a possible outcome of universalism that:
We interfere in the name of ‘human rights’ of certain men and women using
standards that make no sense to them, principles that violate their cherished
frameworks, and bewildering conceptions that fly in the face of all they believe
about themselves.60
In short, the need to criticize in fact flows from human rights themselves: human
rights are a form of critique directed at existing practices. Therefore, human rights
and criticism should not be seen as incompatible objectives but presume one an-
other. When constructive criticism becomes unwelcome, there is not much point
to human rights either.
55See, most notably, Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law:
A Feminist Analysis. (Manchester University Press: 2000) esp. at 201-249.
56Published in 1 European Journal of International Law (1990) 1-32.
57David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton
University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2004) 3.
58Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2000)
8.
59Ibid.
60Jeremy Waldron: ”Nonsense upon Stilts? – a reply” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), ‘Nonsense upon
Stilts’. Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen: London and New York, 1987) 155-209
at 167 [footnote omitted].
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When it comes to the EU’s human rights policies, they have no doubt been
one of the most popular areas of research in EU law during the past ten or fifteen
years.61 Thus, I am not saying that there have been no other critiques of EU human
rights policies. Such criticism has, however, relied heavily on the same premises
that the Union itself is invoking. For example, whether the universality of rights
is actually a suitable justification for the EU’s external policies, or whether ‘com-
mon values’ can function as a basis of integration, are seldom (if ever) questioned.
Instead, several studies have underlined the inconsistency between the Union’s
different spheres of action.62 I have felt that one should go deeper than this, as
human rights protection in general can only benefit from amore ‘profoundly’ crit-
ical approach revealing where the strengths and weak spots of the current system
and its foundations lie. This is not a question of showing the EU as a good or bad
human rights actor but finding out why its claim appears unsustainable and why
those policies are so ineffective: critical assessment is necessary so as to diagnose
weaknesses and suggest improvements.
While I have had no serious doubts about my own status as a ‘human rights
lawyer’, I have noted that the relationship between the EU and the human rights
movement is more complicated. While they embrace much of the same language,
the EU is actually very reluctant to join the efforts of the movement. In all areas
that I can think of, instead of strengthening existing methods of human rights
protection, the EU actually contributes to multiplying (regional or global) human
rights arrangements by adding its own regimes and standards. In “All Dressed
up and Nowhere to Go” and “When Every Picture Tells a Story” this was visible in
the drafting of a human rights bill for the Union instead of joining the existing
mechanisms under the Council of Europe; in “Between Universalism and Identity”
the EU engaged in human rights monitoring in the Eastern and Central European
States instead of, for example, on the mechanisms of the Council of Europe or
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; in “European Univer-
salism?” I noted a similar preference for its own standards (though often quite
imprecise) instead of the apparatus developed by the United Nations or regional
human rights organisations. None of these papers showed any clear added value
for the EU having its own systems of protection, other than that relating to in-
stitutional power: by invoking its own standards the EU could place itself in the
position of supervising the implementation of these rights with reference to its
own interests and priorities. This is of course another indication of the politiza-
tion of rights and something that I will explore later in greater detail. But it also
contradicts the EU statements of universality: If the standards and objectives are
the same, then why the need for new ones? Why does it make a difference who
implements them? This is something that has made it difficult to place the EU on
the ‘human rights map’: it does speak the language, but has its own standards
and methods of monitoring.
61Further references can be found in the bibliography.
62For references, see e.g. those given in “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go”, “Between Universalism
and Identity” and “European Universalism?”.
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I have also felt that there is a considerable gap between the declarations of
the European Union and both international law in general and international hu-
man rights law in particular. This awkward relationship is exemplified by the
abstract generalisations of international law norms that the EU relies on. A partic-
ularly striking example of this is presented in “European Universalism?”, in which
it emerged that the EU’s conception of the position of human rights norms in inter-
national law did not necessarily coincide with that of most international lawyers.
Another example was the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which
despite having no formal status as a source of law was often referred to by the
EU as the relevant authority.63 In my view, this was something that the EU and
the human rights movement had in common: they both tended to stretch many
human rights doctrines further than international law in general would allow.64
This kind of ‘human rightism’ has been criticized for its “tendency to indulge in
wishful thinking and take sketchily emerging trends or, worse still, trends that
exist solely in the form of aspirations, as legal facts”.65 One reason for this tend-
ency might be that most research projects have been placed either in the area of
European law, international law or human rights law. The three discussions sel-
dom seem to meet in order to explore the validity of the general assumptions they
have imported from the other disciplines as more or less self-evident facts. This
practice disregards the fact that the status and contents of many of these doctrines
are fiercely debated within their own disciplines. The understanding of univer-
sality in European law served again as a good reminder of this: for any competent
international lawyer, the EU claim of universality and its implications would have
needed much more justification. In order to avoid these risks, I have considered
both the EU and human rights as a part of the international law framework.66
Another possible reason for such ‘human rightism’ is the potential blurring of
the distinction between moral rights and legal rights. The human rights of mod-
63See e.g. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The
European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries, Brussels, 8
May 2001, COM(2001) 252 final, 3: “The basis for European Union (EU) action is clear. The European
Union seeks to uphold the universality and indivisibility of human rights – civil, political, economic,
social and cultural – as reaffirmed by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.”
64One example is the quote by Professor Schermers that I used in “When Every Picture Tells a Story”,
in which he argued that the way in which the ECJ reviews Community acts and national acts imple-
menting them in light of human rights standards, and the political declarations on human rights that
the Community institutions have produced imply that “the Community considers itself competent to
regulate matters in the field of human rights”. See H G Schermers, ‘Comments and Conclusions’ in
CELS Occasional PaperNo. 1 (Centre for European Legal Studies: Cambridge, 1996) 14. Against a more
traditional EU law reading of the allocation of competence it would, of course, be highly questionable,
to say the least, what effect political declarations can have on competence.
65Alain Pellet, ”‘Human rightism’ and international law”, Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture de-
livered on 18 July 2000 (United Nations 2000) 5. On the political ethos of human rights law, see also
Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties”,
15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002) 553-573 at 569-570.
66Studying the EU actions, EU law and human rights as a part of the wider international law con-
text is important also because, as the European Court of Justice has reminded us, the EU/EC “must re-
spect international law in the exercise of its powers”. Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzol-
lamt Mainz, [1998] ECR I-3655, Para 45.
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ern liberal states – and by extension, the EU – belong to the latter group and re-
ceive their legal form in international human rights instruments. In other words,
the legal conception of human rights cannot be directly derived frommorality; in-
stead, it has been modelled after the modern concept of individual liberties and is
firmly based in legal positivism (at least nominally), thus making the conception
“distinctly judicial in character”.67 This form of validity points out how human
rights as legal rights require the existence of ‘law’ for their enforcement; thus they
are tied to an existing national, international or global legal order, in which their
protection is possible.68 The moral idea behind human rights, and the theory and
argument behind them, again, is abstract in nature and expresses a “universal as-
piration”.69 When this aspiration takes the form of a legal text, it becomes closely
attached to a particular society, historical period or set of cultural resonances.70
This entails that once human rights are implemented in a particular situation they
lose much of their universality: they are no longer applicable to all possible situ-
ations. Universality of rights – meaningful as an “aspiration” – is often defended
with reference to the embeddedness of rights in morality. But the problem here is
that there is no structure within which moral rights could be enforced; thus they
remain an aspiration, a horizon. Legal rights, again, irrespectively of the universal
validity that they claim, have “an unambiguously positive form only within the
national legal order of the democratic state”.71 Their validity in international law
is currently weak, and its strengthening would require their institutionalization as
a part of a truly cosmopolitan order.72 That this has so far not taken place explains
many of the problems in the enforcement of legal rights.
At this point, one should also note another conceptual difference, which I will
demonstrate later in greater detail: the distinction between ‘human rights’ and
‘human rights language’. This distinction is relevant when considering whether
the increasing use of rights-rhetoric everywhere in administration is necessarily
a good thing.73 For example, Günther has argued that “the more human rights
become an unproblematic part of daily political and legal practice, the more they
67Jürgen Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of TwoHundred Years’ Hind-
sight” in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmo-
politan Ideal (MIT Press: 1997) 113-153, 137.
68Ibid., 140.
69On this, see JeremyWaldron: ”Nonsense upon Stilts? – a reply” in JeremyWaldron (ed.), ‘Nonsense
upon Stilts’. Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen: London and New York: 1987)155-
209 at 179.
70Ibid.; Klaus Günther, “The Legacies of Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to Human Rights
and their Effects on Political Culture” in Philip Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford
University Press: 1999) 117-144, 127.
71Jürgen Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of TwoHundred Years’ Hind-
sight” in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmo-
politan Ideal (The MIT Press: 1997) 113-153, 140.
72Ibid. According to Habermas, such an order would entail, among other things, that human rights
violations would be prosecuted as criminal acts according to institutionalized legal procedures. An
individual actor’s (like the EU’s) actions would seem to fall outside this vision.
73For a similar point, see Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture” in Philip
Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press: 1999) 99-116, 115.
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operate with silent exclusions, ignoring suffering, needs, and interests as long as
they do not fit with the scope of their application”.74 This is, of course, very rel-
evant for the ECJ’s rights jurisprudence, and for instance its declaration that there
exists a ‘right to trade’.75 Baxi has expressed concern about how the “paradigm of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is being steadily, but surely,
supplanted by that of trade-related, market friendly human rights”.76 This “mar-
ketized version of human rights appears to appropriate and reverse traditional
understandings of important human rights doctrines and the uses for which they
were formulated”.77 A good example of this is also presented in “European Univer-
salism?” in relation to the right to development. More specifically, it is not by any
means self-evident that the increasing use of human rights language – in other
words, the labeling of an increasing amount of claimed benefits as the ‘rights’ of
those who claim them - or the fact that human rights have become mainstream,
automatically advances and develops the protection of human rights in a good
direction.78 Talking about human rights does not necessarily mean that some-
thing is actually being done, and might even be counterproductive.79 So why
bother?
There are many good things that international talk about human rights has
achieved. However, sometimes good intentions create bad outcomes: Human
rights language is used for the wrong reasons, and the objectives we believe are
inevitably good are not necessarily good when implemented in practice.80 An ori-
74Klaus Günther, “The Legacies of Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to Human Rights
and their Effects on Political Culture” in Philip Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford
University Press: 1999) 117-144, 122.
75For more unorthodox ‘rights’ in the ECJ jurisprudence, see Case 44/79Hauer, [1982] ECR 1575 for
the ‘rights’ to trade and property, and Case 155/79 AM&S, [1979] ECR 3727 for the right to confiden-
tiality between lawyer and client.
76For this new, corporate centred paradigm, see Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (OUP
2002), 132. [Emphasis omitted.] Of relevance here is also the recent debate between Professors Alston
and Petersmann on the possibility and basis of integrating human rights into the policies of world-
wide organizations, especially the WTO and the appropriateness of the EU as a model, both of which
Petersmann supports and Alston criticizes; and the role and position of human rights in international
law in general, published in the European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, available
at http://ejil.org/. Site last visited on 20 December 2004.
77Antony Anghie, “Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions,
and the Third World”, 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2000), 243-290 at
253. Anghie writes mainly in the context of International Financial Institutions, but his analysis bears
much relevance for the EU actions, as well. He calls for contesting this practice by “identifying the
manoeuvres used by economic actors who are intent on employing the vocabulary of human rights to
justify their actions”. Ibid., 272.
78On this, see Martti Koskenniemi, “The Pull of the Mainstream”, 88 Michigan Law Review (1990)
1946, 1962.
79For example, Kerry Rittich has demonstrated this in the context of economic restructuring and
the rights and status of women, see Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring. Law, Distribution and
Gender in Market Reform (Kluwer Law International: 2002).
80On this, see especially David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanit-
arianism (Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2004). In his book, Kennedy encourages
searching: questioning is good because, instead of weakening and undermining the ‘project’, it in fact
makes human rights stronger.
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ginally emancipatory language becomes a legitimizing screen over bureaucratic
patterns and elitism, for instance. I hope this study has shown that it is precisely
in that regard that some aspects of the EU attempts should be reconsidered. While
the EU is today both capable and willing, as I believe, to do ‘good’, many of its
actions appear ineffective, badly justified, or simply arrogant and should be re-
considered. The challenge thus seems to be drawing the balance between criti-
cizing the bad aspects while recognizing the good aspects, or as Susan Marks has
formulated the question in relation to democracy:
How is [an analyst] to retain a sense of democracy’s achievements and po-
tentials, while also remaining alert to its very considerable omissions and
limitations?81
The relationship of this thesis with human rights law and the international human
rights movement is complicated. To some extent, of course, the criticism here
is also a critique of what human rights lawyers do. But unlike many of them,
I cannot believe that articulating deficiencies would be harmful to the objective
that we, after all, share: more effective human rights protection. I just felt that this
thesis needed to be written because I do not see the current regime functioning in
a way that would be worthy of its vital objectives. As Ignatieff has argued:
All forms of power are open to abuse, and there is no reason why power that
legitimizes itself in the name of human rights should not end up as open to
abuse as any other. Those who will end with power may only be those who
have power already.82
The difficulties encountered in placing this study in any very clear disciplin-
ary category have been more a result of the fact that the object of the study, the
EU’s human rights doctrine and its practical implementation, are difficult to situ-
ate. Susan Marks’, and to lesser extent Kerry Rittich’s, writings have acted as a
specific source of inspiration for this thesis.83 They have expressed concern about
the way in which human rights arguments have been used by strongWestern act-
ors with the effect of impoverishing the local debates. Especially Susan Marks
has represented the possibility of and difficulties involved in trying to combine
critical remarks with faith in human rights. Even if this thesis might sit slightly
uncomfortably in the company of general human rights related literature, its main
objective is to strengthen the EU’s regime for human rights protection. Its object-
ive is to speak to both EU and human rights lawyers.
81SusanMarks, The Riddle of all Constitutions. International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology
(Oxford University Press: 2000) 147.
82Michael Ignatieff,Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (introduced and edited by Amy Gutmann),
(Princeton University Press: 2001) 47.
83See in particular, Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions. International Law, Democracy and
the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press: 2000), Susan Marks, “Nightmare and Noble Dream;
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights”, Cambridge Law Journal (1994) 54-62; Susan Marks,
“Guarding the Gates with Two Faces: International Law and Political Reconstruction”, Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies (Spring 1999) 457. For Kerry Rittich, see especially Recharacterizing Restructuring.
Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform (Kluwer Law International: 2002).
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Universality
The starting point of most human rights literature is the claim of universal valid-
ity attached to human rights.84 It is believed that because human rights and the
human condition are universal, and despite diverse divisive social elements, “all
of us want the same things”.85 Human rights are believed to be held “universally”
by all and to be valid against all persons and institutions, as Donnelly has argued.
This positions them as the “highest moral rights [that, PL] regulate the funda-
mental structures and practices of political life, and in ordinary situations they
take priority over other moral, legal and political claims”.86 Human rights are
believed to be “almost universally accepted, at least in word, or as ideal stand-
ards”.87 They constitute “a legitimate and well-established international con-
cern”. Thus, “[s]hort of force, states are free to use most ordinary means of foreign
policy on behalf of internationally recognized human rights”.88 This is arguably
the background against which most of the relevant literature (including EU law
literature on human rights) explores human rights. In fact, we are so used to this
language, at least in Western societies, that we repeat it without much further re-
flection of its meaning. I have wanted to study this easy self-evidence. But instead
of beginning from the general assertion of the universality of rights, I have star-
ted with a question relating to the accuracy of this statement: Are human rights
truly universal? What does universalism entail in practice? Who defines what the
‘universal’ is?
This is not to say that there would not already be a developed set of criticisms
of the idea of ‘universality’ – quite the opposite. The ‘universal’ or ‘relative’ char-
acter of human rights is subject to an on-going debate and contention in many
critically oriented academic approaches.89 But even more generally, few people
deny that while human rights are believed to be universal, they simultaneously,
and paradoxically, warrant a Western heritage. In fact, it seems that numerous
84On this, see e.g. Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context. Law,
Politics, Morals. Text and Materials (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996) 366; Jack Donnelly: ’The social
construction of international human rights’ in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Human Rights in
Global Politics (Cambridge University Press: 1999) 71-102; Louis Henkin, “Introduction” in Louis Hen-
kin (ed.), The International Bill of Rights – The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Columbia University
Press: New York, 1981) 1-31.
85Rosalyn Higgins, “The Continuing Universality of the Universal Declaration” in Peter Baehr,
Cees Flinterman and Mignon Senders (eds.), Innovation and Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal De-
claration of Human Rights (Koninklije Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen: Amsterdam, 1999)
17-26, 26. Higgins continues: “We all want a certain security for ourselves and our families, the free-
dom to say and believe as we choose, enough to eat and a roof over our heads, and equality in pursuing
our dreams and opportunities.”
86Jack Donnelly,Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edition, Cornell University Press:
2003) 1. For Donnelly, this is an indication of the “moral universality” of rights.
87Ibid. For Donnelly, this is the foundation of the “international normative universality of human
rights” [emphasis omitted].
88Ibid., 109.
89For further references to e.g. cultural relativist and feminist critiques, see below for those given
in the next paragraph.
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Western philosophers and political thinkers since Immanuel Kant90 have tried to
square the circle of how it is possible for a politics to be both contingent and uni-
versal; both conditioned by a specific historical moment and yet valid irrespective
of time and place. It is the reactions to the relationship between the Western ori-
gins and the asserted universality of human rights that vary.
For many, the Western origins of rights do not prevent them from being uni-
versally shared today.91 For others, however, rights are always dependent on their
cultural context.92 Even though the idea of human rights might be valid, rights
should be interpreted differently inWestern and non-Western environments. This
is because the legitimacy and the meaning of moral claims are closely attached to
a particular cultural tradition. This is paradoxically true even of the so-called uni-
versal rights – after all, this is a set of ideas emerging from the Western Enlight-
enment.93 This is known as the ‘cultural relativism’ debate. During the past ten
years, since the Vienna Human Rights Conference, the attack on universality and
campaign for cultural relativism have grown remarkably, indicating, as Bayefsky
has argued, that it would be impossible to reach consensus on the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights today. This is because:
References to universal human rights would have to be accompanied by qual-
ifications based on such factors as historical, cultural, religious, ethical and
philosophical particularities. And if anything, the list of restrictions is grow-
ing longer.94
Criticism is especially directed at Western self-righteousness, without necessar-
ily suggesting that sensitivity to religious, cultural and social customs justifies
the toleration of grave human rights violations.95 But even others than ‘cultural
relativists’ have argued that the reference to the ‘universal’ is in fact highly exclus-
ive in its scope, and refers mainly to “the humanist standard of the autonomous,
European, masculine individual”.96 As a result of this, they argue, the so-called
universal human rights turn into a “strategic effect of power networks, not the
neutral product of the application of value-free universal legal rules and reason-
90On this, see especially “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Kant’s
Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press: 1970/1991) 41-53.
91On this, see e.g. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edition, Cornell
University Press: 2003) esp. at 89-106, who argues that human rights are “relatively universal”.
92See Jack Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights”, (1984) 6 Human Rights
Quarterly 400-419.
93On this, see e.g. Diane F. Orentlicher, “Relativism and Religion”, in Michael Ignatieff, Human
Rights as Politics and Idolatry (introduced and edited by Amy Gutmann), (Princeton University Press:
2001) 141-158, 141; Makau wa Mutua, “The Ideology of Human Rights”, 36 Virginia Journal of Interna-
tional Law (1996) 589-657.
94Anne F. Bayefsky, “Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism and International Human Rights: New Ex-
cuses for Old Strategies” 9(1) Ratio Juris (1996) 42-59 at 45.
95See e.g. Onuma Yasuaki, “Towards an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights”, 7 Asian
Yearbook of International Law (1997) 21-81 at 26-27.
96Dianne Otto, “Everything is Dangerous: Some Post-structural Tools for Rethinking the Universal
Knowledge Claims of Human Rights Law”, 5(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights (1998) 17-47 at 40.
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ing”.97 These views are strongly rejected by others, for example, Sloane, who in
his “Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights” argues
that
[. . . ]because the liberal values that find expression in international human
rights law do respect the paramount importance of reasonable tolerance and
autonomy, “universal” human rights law proves highly inclusive, accom-
modating, and tolerant of the diversity of cultural traditions and values that
comprise the contemporary international community.98
This seems to show that there are quite a few understandings of the relationship
between the ‘universal’ rights and their Western origins. Therefore, in order to
analyse the EU approach, it is useful to look at how the ‘European’ and the ‘uni-
versal’ have been perceived in its own statements.
One of the earliest attempts within the European Communities to give a defin-
ition for ‘Europe’ took place in December 1973, when the 9 EEC heads of states
adopted a Declaration on European Identity.99 At that time, it was considered
that defining the European identity required reflecting on three separate factors:
first, a common heritage, interests and special obligations and the degree of unity
achieved within the Community; second, the extent to which the Nine were alrea-
dy acting together in relation to the rest of the world; and third, the dynamic
nature of European unification. Unity was much based on the “cherished values
of their legal, political and moral order” and the “same attitudes to life”. As a
result, the Nine were:
determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule
of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress –
and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the
European identity.100
Even though the common foreign policy of the Community remained quite un-
defined and unstructured at the time,101 the Nine attempted a simple character-
isation of this identity in relation to the rest of the world (after all, the point of
identity is to be something that the others are not). The Nine gave a special status
to the United States with reference to their shared values:
The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine – who share
values and aspirations based on a common heritage – are mutually beneficial
97Ibid., 41.
98Robert D. Sloane, “Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of Interna-
tional Human Rights”, 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2001) 527-595 at 537. See also Thomas
M. Franck, The Empowered Self. Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford University Press:
1999).
99Declaration on European Identity by the Heads of State or Government Meeting on 13-14 Decem-
ber 1973, [1973] 12 Bull.EC 118-122.
100Ibid., para 1.
101On the development towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the Union, see e.g. I.
MacLeod, I.D. Hendry and Stephen Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford
University Press: 1996) 411-424.
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and must be preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of
the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity.102
In this sense, the common values were seen as the “thing” for Western Europe
as opposed to Central and Eastern Europe. They were not the sole property of
the Community, however, but shared with the Western world, especially with the
United States. Defining ‘Europe’ with reference to common values thus followed
more closely political than geographical borders.
Thirteen years later, in 1986, and after Greece, Portugal and Spain had joined
the Community, the foreign ministers adopted a new statement on human rights,
which highlights the contribution of human rights to external policies and in-
cludes a stronger reference to universality:
The Twelve seek the universal observance of human rights. The protection of
human rights is the legitimate and continuous duty of the world community
and of nations individually.103
In the last paragraph of the statement, the Twelve underline “their special re-
sponsibility as Europeans”, which places them in a position to emphasize the im-
portance of respect for human rights by all States participating in the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe.104 This emphasis has grown since then.
Today, the Union’s external human rights policies are closely attached to the uni-
versality claim:
The Community and its Member States undertake to pursue their policy of
promoting and safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms through-
out the world. This is the legitimate duty of the world community and of all
States acting individually or collectively. [. . . ] The European Community
and its Member States seek universal respect for human rights.105
For the EU, the universality of human rights, as confirmed by the 1993 Vienna
World Conference, has justified making both trade and development aid condi-
tional on the implementation of human rights by third states.106 In the rhetoric
that the Union uses in relation to third states, the emphasis is extended to all the
central characteristics of human rights:
102Declaration on European Identity by the Heads of State or Government Meeting on 14 December
1973, [1973] 12 Bull.EC 118-122, para 14.
103Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Human Rights, 21 July 1986, Bull. EC 7/8-1986 at 100, point
2.4.4. A year later, Morocco’s application for membership was rejected due to its non-European status.
104Ibid.
105Declaration on human rights, adopted by the European Council, [1991] 6 Bull. EC 17, point 1.45.
See also Statement on human rights, adopted by the ForeignMinisters meeting in political cooperation
in Brussels on 21 July 1986, [1986] 7/8 Bull. EC 100, point 2.4.4. The same vision is continued in The
European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy. From Rome to Maastricht and
Beyond, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, Brussels, 22
November 1995, COM (95) 567 final.
106See e.g. the Declaration of the European Union on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Vienna, 10 December, 1998.
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Human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent. They bind every
government body and may not be restricted. Whether civil and political or
economic, social and cultural in nature, they must be respected and promoted
in their entirety.107
The confidence with which the Union today speaks of human rights, demo-
cracy, the rule of law and good governance is, of course, not without connection
to the global political transformations of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s - it is
clearly less risky to speak about the ‘universal’ when there are few competing
models. As Barber has found, during the 1990’s, liberal democracy has become
such a powerful model that apparent alternatives to it are absent for “those seek-
ing other legitimate forms of politics”. This leaves the Western states “with no
standard against which to measure their own liberal politics and with no ideal
by which to modify them, should they wish to do so”.108 Today, the discourse
of human rights provides social and governmental practices with an unpreceden-
ted degree of political legitimacy, especially in the West. That legitimacy cannot
be dissociated from the claim of universality, or objectivity, that human rights
defenders make. This approach is in line with the EU’s Security Strategy from
December 2003, which justifies the position of human rights in the world order in
the following manner:
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the govern-
ments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world
of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting
social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, es-
tablishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of
strengthening the international order.109
This view is closely connected to the EU’s wish to present itself as a humaneworld
power in international politics. For the Union, it is especially trade and develop-
ment co-operation policies that serve as tools for this vision:
Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform.
As the world’s largest provider of assistance and its largest trading entity,
the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these
goals.110
The relationship between the universal and the European has not only af-
fected the Union’s relationship with third states, but also the Union’s own self-
perception. As I argued in “Between Universalism and Identity”, the connection
107Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament, Democratisation, the rule of law, re-
spect for human rights and good governance: the challenges of the partnership between the European
Union and the ACP States, 12 March 1998, COM (98) 146 at 4.
108Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age (University of California
Press: 1984/2003) 3.
109A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, document proposed by Javier
Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels, 12
December 2003, at 10.
110Ibid.
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between the ‘political criteria’ and Europe’s own identity has been underlined,
both in the context of the May 2004 enlargement and that of Turkey’s possible
membership, for example in the following way:
From its very beginning European integration has been firmly rooted in a
shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institu-
tions and the rule of law. These common values have proved necessary for
securing peace and developing prosperity in the European Union. They will
also serve as a cornerstone for the enlarging Union.111
The problem is that if human rights, democracy and the rule of law are universal
and as such belong equally to everyone, then it seems quite difficult for Europe
to base its own identity on them, again keeping in mind that identity is by defin-
ition something that should draw a line between ‘us’ and ‘the others’. If ‘we’ is
defined by reference to clear and unambiguous ‘good’ values, then ‘they’ are re-
legated into vehicle of antivalues, of ‘bad’ values. Therefore, the clearer the value-
connection of European identity, the sharper is the dichotomy between Europe
and that which is outside. As I explained in “Between Universalism and Identity”,
Turkey has formed perhaps the most acute question of delimitation between ‘us’
and ‘them’, and value-based assumptions about who is European and who is not
have earlier been central.112 Alternatively, the European identity can be seen as
an expansive one, explaining the EU as the defender of values that are shared by
all: though the values are indeed universal, Europe received them first.113 Thus,
it is Europe’s special task (‘white man’s burden’) to spread those values (because
they are not really Europe’s, but universal) elsewhere in the world. Today, the EU
is one of the most visible protagonists of the language of universal human rights
in international fora. In this way, as I argued in “European Universalism?”, the EU
is continuing Europe’s civilizing mission. This vision also supports the founda-
tional paradox of European human rights: on the one hand, the historical heritage
of Europe; on the other, universal. My basic problem thus became: How to explain
human rights as both universal and the defining characteristic of Europe?
The answer that I found was abstraction. To some extent, it was surely correct
to talk about the idea of human rights as something commonly shared between
theMember States. But while most Europeans embraced the idea of human rights,
and even agreed on the enumeration of a number of civil, political, economic and
social rights, they often completely disagreed on what those rights might mean
111See Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, “Towards a
Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones”, para 1.
112See also Helene Sjursen and Karen E. Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpin-
ning EU Enlargement”, ARENA Working Paper no 1, 25 (January 2001). For Turkey, see also the section
on “Up-date” below. For discussion of other historical “asymmetric counterconcepts”, see Reinhart
Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated and with introduction by Keith
Tribe (Columbia University Press: New York, 2004) 155-191.
113On this, see especially “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Kant’s
Political Writings (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press: 1990) 41-53, in which Kant explains history
to be moving towards a civil society that can administer justice universally. The political constitutions
and their constant progress in our continent are likely to serve as a model for all other continents.
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in political practice, i.e. how rights should be implemented. For example, every-
body favoured the right to life, the basic freedoms, minimal social and economic
welfare, but when such rights were translated into policies, and involved the al-
location of scarce resources, then their universality was lost and disagreement
emerged. This seemed to contradict the idea of universality already ‘at home’,
in Europe. The language of ‘common values’ appeared equally obscure.114 Des-
pite the emphasis on what was shared, the Member States were actually quite
different. The same point was strikingly demonstrated by the European Court
on Human Rights, which discussed what the concept of morals consisted of that
could be used as a basis for delimiting rights in the Handyside case:
In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Con-
tracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by
their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time
and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid
and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject.115
For human rights (and values) to be both nation-specific and common to all states
at the same time, they necessarily need to be very general and allow for local
adjustments and exceptions. As discussed in “A European Approach to Human
Rights?”, for instance euthanasia, death penalty and abortion have all been both
justified and contested with references to the same right, the right to life.116 It
thus appeared that the universality of human rights relies on the great degree of
abstraction at which rights were articulated in national constitutions or legisla-
tions or indeed in the resolutions and reports of international organizations. But
if rights are universal only so long they are ‘empty’ in this way, and immediately
start to seem particular when they are given a substantive content, what possible
significance might they have? What is the value of a universal that has no sub-
stance?
The abstraction of rights had numerous implications. If the implementation
of rights required evaluation and adjustment locally, it became unclear whether
114Moreover, it often seems difficult to distinguish the language of values from the language of
rights, as the two seem to be largely overlapping. On this, see e.g. the Constitution for the EU on
the Union’s values, as established by article I-2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in
a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.”
115Case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, (1976) Series A No 24 at para 48. The Court confirmed
12 years later in the Case of Müller and Others v. Switzerland, (1988) Series A No 133 at para 35 that
“as at the time of the Handyside judgment [. . . ]it is not possible to find in the legal and social orders
of the Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals.” Both judgments are all the more
interesting against the background that since they date back to the period before the Central and East-
ern European States joined the Council of Europe, the “Contracting States” referred to in the judgment
mainly consisted of the Western EU Member States, which, after all, are a relatively homogenous lot.
116See especially article 2 ECHR, which, however, gives the impression that the right to life can be
limited if certain procedural limitations are fulfilled. See also Protocol 6 to the Covention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty (adopted at Stras-
bourg on 28 April 1983, entered into force on 1 March 1985, CETS No 114).
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human rights might function as a suitable basis for integration; something that
I explored in “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go”. Similarly, as I illustrated in
“When Every Picture Tells a Story”, rights could hardly function as a clearly defined
‘field’ or area of competence. Their empty nature also put to question the extent to
which rights might provide criteria for membership in the Union or form the basis
of conditionality in the context of trade and development cooperation, something
that I discussed in “Between Universalism and Identity” and in “European Universal-
ism?”. However, despite the problems I observed, it is not difficult to see why the
use of universal language in order to justify conditionality seems attractive for the
EU (and other Western organizations using the same language): rights language
seems to connect the objective sought to much greater goals, giving these reforms
“an aura of authority and legitimacy” and suggesting that they actually “provide
protection against the abuse of the powerful”.117 But even this effect seems to be
undermined by the abstraction and emptiness of the achieved language. Due to
the abstraction of the norms, values and arguments that human rights constitute,
objectivity is impossible to achieve in practice: human rights arguments require
case-by-case analysis, which in its turn makes the achievement of absolute uni-
formity impossible.118 Finding good solutions is difficult also because making
the arrangements more detailed is hard to justify, either because agreement on it
cannot be reached or because this would only imply intervening more. At the
same time, ignoring human rights considerations is a political impossibility. On
the practical level, this leaves the EU with nothing but bad alternatives to choose
from.
But on a theoretical level the problems relating to universality stretch much
further. When I analysed the EU’s statements from a more theory-oriented point-
of-view I noted that its strategy aimed to connect the particular (the European, the
Western) with the universal (the so-called international customary law on human
rights). But even here universality and abstraction were closely linked: As the
universal only existed at the level of an abstract principle and escaped definition,
articulating it in any specific manner was impossible. Moreover, as I explained
in “European Universalism?”, even if human rights were universal, it did not auto-
matically follow that some entity (EU) would be entitled to enforce them. The
question thus seemed to be, under what conditions could the EU claim to be ‘rep-
resenting’ the universal?
For the EU, the ‘universal’ in the area of human rights is embodied in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and its ‘confirmation’ by the Vienna Human
Rights Conference in 1993.119 While there is nothing fundamentally wrong in us-
ing the Universal Declaration as a reference, the problem is that in many cases the
117Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring. Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform
(Kluwer Law International: 2002) 68. Writing in relation to market reforms, Rittich argues that rights
language “associates the project of market reform with freedom and democracy.” Ibid.
118For thoughts going in this direction, see Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political
Culture” in Philip Alston et al. (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press: 1999) 99-116,
esp. 107-113.
119For further references, see those given in “European Universalism?”
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UDHR cannot alone justify the choice of a specific policy: Because the UDHR is so
general, it is not capable of guiding or defining policies. Its universality justifies
disagreement about its implications in practice. Because the universality of the
Declaration is only abstract, it is easily taken over by anyone with a strong voice,
claiming to speak for the ‘universal’. When the UDHR is used as a basis of con-
ditionality, its ambiguity is transferred to the standards invoked. In the cases that
I studied, this resulted in the EU defining the contents of the Declaration; thus,
its charm turned against those states that were at the receiving end. As shown
in “European Universalism?”, the procedure relating to the usage of human rights
conditionality in practice onlyworks in one direction, reflecting the interests of the
stronger party (the EU) This suggests that the particular (the EU) invokes the uni-
versal language mainly in order to promote its own objectives. As a consequence,
I argued, in referring to universality the EU is not really representing that which
is genuinely shared, but acts as a ‘false universal’.
The most important problem relating to the EU’s pursuit of universality is its
limited view of the purpose of having a dialogue with a third state. The impres-
sion comes not only from observing the EU-ACP relationship, as discussed in
“European Universalism?”, but also that between the EU and its Candidate Coun-
tries. As discussed in “Between Universalism and Identity”, the “structural dia-
logue” between theUnion and its futuremembers lacked an actual role in decision-
making,120 and came to be known as “structural monologue”.121 A similar un-
derstanding of the meaning of dialogue is also reflected in the ‘EU guidelines
on human rights dialogues’ adopted by the Council in 2001.122 For the EU, the
purpose of having a dialogue seems to be this: dialogue is either used in order
to share broadly converging views, as with Western states, or then in order to
achieve change in a third state based on the concerns and wishes of the EU. Thus,
to put it bluntly, either we are the same at the beginning of the dialogue, or then
you should become more like us. However, ‘dialogue’ should by definition be
about an exchange of rational ideas based on respect for each other’s value and
norm systems.123 In general, the idea behind the concept of ‘dialogue’ focuses
on the “meeting of different positions”, not a merging or assimilation of them.124
For these reasons, genuine universality would also require a more open under-
standing of dialogue than that currently implemented by the EU. As Žižek has
120See also Kirstyn Inglis, “The Europe Agreements Compared in Light of Their Pre-Accession Re-
orientation”, 37 Common Market Law Review (2000) 1173-1210, 1182.
121See Klau, “Tackling the structural monologue”, 2(8) European Voice (22 February 1996), 22-28,
whose descriptive article has been widely quoted by others.
122See the European Union guidelines on human rights dialogues, adopted by the Council of the EU
on 13 December 2001. The guidelines are strictly external in their orientation and include no mention
of any need of progress or changes within the EU itself.
123See Outi Korhonen, “Voidaanko ihmisoikeuksien ja uskonnon suhde ratkaista poliittisen
keskustelun kautta?” in Kristiina Kouros and Susan Villa (eds.), Ihmisoikeudet ja islam (Like: Keuruu,
2004) 339-343 at 340-342.
124See Outi Korhonen, “Dialogue among Civilizations: International Law, Human Rights and Dif-
ference” in Lauri Hannikainen and Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour, Dialogue among Civilizations. The Case of
Finnish-Iranian Human Rights Expert Dialogue (The Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority
Law, University of Lapland: Rovaniemi, 2002) 30-45 at 33.
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argued, only ‘dead’ or ‘abstract’ universality comes with its own fixed inclusions
and exclusions; universality that is ‘living’ and ‘concrete’ presumes a
permanent process of the questioning and the renegotiation of its own “offi-
cial” content. Universality becomes “actual” precisely and only by rendering
thematic the exclusions on which it is grounded, by continuously question-
ing, renegotiating, displacing them, that is, by assuming the gap between
its own form and content, by conceiving itself as unaccomplished in its very
notion.125
I understood Žižek’s view on universalism as entailing that the EU could not
alone determine the universal or universal human rights. It seemed to counter
the Western liberal view that human rights constitute the universally accepted
way to change the world. True universality requires openness in relation to its
contents more than a set of criteria laid out by one party for the other to fulfil.126
Instead, dialogue is needed; legitimate outcomes presume a procedural dimen-
sion, a “communicative arrangement” that institutionalises the forms of commu-
nication required for a dialogue.127 Consensus presumes “relations of mutual re-
cognition, mutual role-taking, a shared willingness to consider one’s own tradi-
tion with the eyes of the stranger and to learn from one another, and so forth”.128
This presumes the crucial acknowledgement that my own view is not necessarily
the (only) correct interpretation; I, too, may need to change.
In “European Universalism?” I made a distinction between two kinds of uni-
versality. The rather aggressive kind of universality, which for the EU justified
interference and conditionality, gave birth to the expectations of coherence and
objectivity. But at the same time, ‘universality’ could also stand for willingness to
accept and embrace differences. Could it not be thought that the function of hu-
man rights is mainly in empowering individuals against their own governments?
Then objectivity would be less crucial, because human rights could be adapted
to individual and regional approaches. This universality seems more compatible
with the wishes of the non-Western world, with the EU version then emerging
as its own particularist interpretation, one which appears contested and false. In
short, it seemed that the universality of rights is not the correct reference for those
EU policies that are based on political conditionality. Based on what has been uni-
125Slavoj Žižek , “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please!” in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau
and Slavoj Žižek (eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London
and New York: Verso, 2000) 90-135 at 102.
126This would seem to coincide with the vision reflected in the resolution on a “Global Agenda for
Dialogue among Civilizations”, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 21 November
2001: “Dialogue among civilizations is a process between and within civilizations, founded on inclu-
sion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared meaning and
core values and integrate multiple perspectives through dialogue.” A/RES/56/6, Article 1.
127On this communicative arrangement, see Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation through
Human Rights” in Jürgen Habermas. The postnational constellation: political essays, translated, edited, and
with an introduction by Max Pensky (MIT Press: 2001) 113-153, 117.
128Ibid., 129.
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versally accepted, embracing all understandings in the world, it seems difficult to
invoke negative conditionality.
At the practical level, this means that the EU should reconsider its policies
based on human rights conditionality and review the processes of implementa-
tion quite fundamentally. Today, the EU relies largely on negative human rights
policies, such as threats to break off trade relations and stop aid. While more
dialogue-oriented incentive measures have been recently introduced, such as aid
given to national human rights institutions or NGOs in the recipient countries,
they merely count for 1% of the Commission’s external aid budget.129 This gives
the impression that these possibilities are not considered a very central aspect of
EU development policies. However, this is not to say that the dialogue-based ap-
proach would be without problems. The political dialogue run, for instance, with
China, Iran and the ASEAN states, as implemented today, has emerged as unsat-
isfactory, with the EU appearing as indifferent towards human rights considera-
tions. The obvious risk with dialogue and positive measures is that the ‘carrot’
might not work if there is no ‘stick’. However, there are serious doubts also about
the effectiveness of sanctions: they are not believed to work very well and achieve
the objectives sought after.130 It might be that in many cases the currently used
form of human rights conditionality does not really achieve any other practical
results than allowing the EU to claim it is doing something effective. Therefore,
dialogue might be the most preferable alternative, not only for its theoretical justi-
fication but also for its practical effects. The improvement of the latter would first
of all require a change of attitude, which would then be transformed into concrete
measures through increased resources and time to be invested in the process.
When the universality of rights is challenged, there is a simultaneous chal-
lenge to the indivisibility of human rights. I noted in “A European Approach to
Human Rights?” how contested the status of economic and social rights was. In
brief, a comparison between several Member States suggested that within their
own constitutional orders the idea of indivisibility remained a distant objective,
not to speak of its practical implementation. In a world of limited resources indi-
visibility was impossible to live out in practice, even when it came to some of the
world’s richest states. In “Between Universalism and Identity” I demonstrated how
the interest of the Union in the context of the 2004 enlargement centred around
the realization of civil and political rights. When resources were re-directed from
economic and social rights to the areas of EU’s special interest, the level of imple-
mentation of the former weakened, and in many cases had become worse since
129On this, see e.g. Synthesis Report on EC activities in the field of human rights, democracy and
good governance, Synthesis Note, 10 August 2001, submitted to Evaluation Unit of the EuropeAid Co-
operation Office, at 6, prepared by Emery Brusset, Emma Achilli and Christine Tiberghien, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/reports/sector/951613_synth.pdf, site last vis-
ited on 30 December 2004. Instead, money goes to various development projects on condition that
‘human rights’ are respected.
130For a useful summary of critiques, see Martin Björklund, EU:n pakotepolitiikka, The Erik Castrén
Institute Research Reports 11/2000, esp. at 69-75. For the classic critical piece analysing the effect-
iveness of sanctions, see Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions. With
Examples from the Case of Rhodesia”, 19(3)World Politics (1967) 378-416.
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the early 1990s. But as there was no real national tradition of implementing civil
and political rights, their implementation was also quite incomplete. The lack
of contextual approaches from the EU’s part thus actually caused a drop in the
overall level of human rights protection while, ironically, the EU policy was justi-
fied with the need to improve the overall human rights situation in the Candidate
States. This seemed to prove that human rights were sometimes capable of re-
flecting even totally contradictory ideas. In the same way, human rights have
been used to support either political or economic rights; social or cultural rights,
the welfare state ideal or the classic night watchman state. In brief, rights seemed
to require a political context in order to have more determinate contents. They
reflect a political community instead of creating one.
Human Rights and Politics
The working title of my thesis was “The politics of human rights in the European
Union” because it was conducted in a group of three researchers under a wider
project on the politicization of human rights in international institutions.131 As
a result of this, the question I was often asked was whether this in fact was a
study in political science or international relations rather than law. This was of
course not the case. For most lawyers, including myself, whereas law is ‘good’
and preferable, politics is ‘bad’. Politics presume the use of discretion, which
might lead to biased or unfair results. Therefore, one shouldmove from the sphere
of politics towards the sphere of law, not least because law is accompanied by
good principles like legal certainty and the rule of law, which set limits to the
discretion of those in administrative positions to decide in accordance with their
preferences. While law is ‘objective’, politics is ‘subjective’.132 This was one of
the assumptions that I needed to reconsider as my writing proceeded. In short,
my intention was to examine how deeply human rights law was embedded in
political considerations. In this way, my study was connected (albeit loosely) to
the strand of critical jurisprudence for which examining the close links between
law and politics is a key theme.133
The raison d’être of human rights is that they are non-political. They set limits to
‘politics’. To do this, they must be both independent from and superior to ‘polit-
ics’. Human rights tend to be presented in mainstream human rights literature
131“Human rights and cultural diversity. A study on the politics of human rights in international
institutions.”
132For the last argument, and a critique of this view, seeMartti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia.
The Structure of International Legal Argument (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company: Helsinki, 1989).
133See e.g. David Kennedy, “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box”, 32New York Univer-
sity Journal of International Law and Politics (1999-2000) 335-500 esp. at 476-480; Nigel Purvis, “Critical
Legal Studies in Public International Law”, 32 Harvard International Law Journal (1991) 81-127; David
Kennedy, “My Talk at the ASIL: What is New Thinking in International Law?”, 92 Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law (2000) 104-125; Deborah Cass, “Navigating the Newstream: Re-
cent Critical Legal Scholarship in International Law”, (1996) Nordic Journal of International Law 341-383
esp. at 377-378.
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and international human rights instruments as neutral and free from political con-
frontations. Rights are not only believed to be ‘universal’, they are also believed
to be, as Duncan Kennedy has argued, ‘factoid’, fact-like: an acknowledged right
has automatic consequences, because everybody agrees that its implementation
requires certain measures to be undertaken in an objective manner.134 These two
characteristics make rights claims seem different from mere claims of subjective,
political bias.135 Rights talk and legal reasoning “presuppose about themselves
that they are discourses of necessity, of reason as against mere preference”.136 One
example of this is the United Nations General Assembly resolution relating to the
strengthening of UN action in the human rights field, which has been repeatedly
adopted, traditionally by consensus and largely unchanged since 1990, stating
that
the promotion, protection and full realization of all human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, as legitimate concerns of the world community, should be
guided by the principles of non-selectivity, impartiality and objectivity and
should not be used for political ends.137
The resolution underlines that human rights should not be used as an instrument
in power politics. It is based on the assumption that rights realise themselves
neutrally, or automatically; that their implementation requires no practical choice
or evaluation. Human rights are believed to be, as the former UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has put it, “the ultimate norm of all politics”;138
the supreme law of all laws. This is in line with Ronald Dworkin’s famous thesis
about rights being “political trumps held by individuals”.139 While Dworkin
makes a distinction between abstract rights and concrete rights, he argues that
the latter are defined with sufficient precision that enables them to express the
“weight they have against other political aims on particular occasions”.140 For
the EU, this understanding of the relationship between human rights and politics
has, especially in its external relations, made political debates seem unnecessary.
If rights exist as ‘fact-like’, and their implementation follows automatically from
their formulation, then no politics is needed – indeed, any political deliberation
will seem obstructive, perhaps dangerous.
However, as my work progressed, I came to note that rights were in fact a
prime example of the intermixing of law and politics. The difficulties that I had
134 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {fin de siécle} (Harvard University Press: 1998) 305.
135 Ibid., 306.
136 Ibid., 310.
137United Nations General Assembly resolution on “Strengthening of United Nations action in the
human rights field through the promotion of international co-operation and the strict observance of the
principle of non-intervention”, See e.g. A/RES/45/163 adopted on 18 December 1990; A/RES/46/129
of 17 December 1991, para 5; A/RES/47/131 adopted on 18 December 1992, para 5; A/RES/54/174
of 15 February 2000, para 5; A/RES/56/153 of 13 February 2002, para 5; A/RES/58/168 of 4 March
2004, para 5.
138Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the Opening of the World Conference
on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993, UN Doc. A/Conf. 157/22, 3.
139Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co: London, 1977/2000) xi.
140Ibid., 93.
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observed in relation to the adoption of the EU human rights policies simply de-
pended on the fact that ‘universal human rights’ depended on political decisions
for their implementation. In the EU, and in many national constitutional courts,
human rights were seen as a means of controlling the exercise of power by the
EU institutions. But in fact, human rights constantly played the role of a tool
in a power game between Community and national authorities, courts and in-
stitutions: human rights were very much a political issue. In the EU, ‘human
rights’ were constantly used so as to support and strengthen various policies,
for example in order to justify widening integration or ensure the legitimacy of
governance. This suggested that at least occasionally, ‘human rights’ turned into
‘human rights language’. They became merely an instrument to dress whatever
interest or claimed benefit in the strongest possible terms. Traditional Community
competences were re-described through a language that gave them special sacred-
ness. In particular, human rights became a vehicle for supporting or challenging
the exercise of jurisdiction of particular organs or institutions. But the problem
is this: when every interest-holder or claimant in the political field dresses its
position in rights-terms, human rights loose their critical or emancipatory func-
tion. If everything nice, or economically beneficial, in life is described as a right,
then how to distinguish those claims that are truly important from those that are
merely nice to have? The distinctiveness of human rights diminishes; they become
an unsurpassed marker of legitimacy.141 Such degeneration of human rights into
rights talk is “facilitated by the abuse of human rights for other purposes, eco-
nomic or political, or the ideological use of human rights for the legitimation of
a status quo”.142 In all my papers I noted that the EU was very willing to use hu-
man rights language to describe its objectives, and to justify both past, present
and future actions. The experiences with the Charter, for instance, suggested that
nothing really changed as a consequence of adopting it; it simply provided an
additional injection of legitimacy for the institutions of the EU. In the EU-ACP
relations, again, human rights language came to re-describe the setting between
Europe and its former colonies in new, less questionable terms.
While there was generally no lack of references to human rights in the docu-
ments adopted by the EU, much of these references were included in documents
that were legally non-binding – in Commission Communications, Council declar-
ations or statements and, most notably, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Despite the fancy words, they guaranteed little by way of actual rights that in-
dividuals could base claims on. When something coming closer to the status of
formal law was used, then the clauses tended to be very open-ended and inde-
terminate, which put the politics “back in”. A good example of this abstraction is
article 6(1)-(2) TEU:
141See Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern
Anxieties”, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002) 553-573 at 570.
142Klaus Günther, “The Legacies of Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to Human Rights
and their Effects on Political Culture” in Philip Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford
University Press: 1999) 117-144, 143.
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1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law.
This is an article that in most human rights related analyses written on the EU
is greeted as a confirmation of the ‘fact’ that the EU indeed does protect human
rights. But few problems are solved by this declaration. Political conflict is not
about whether the EU is for ‘liberty’ or ‘democracy’ (as indeed very few would
be against them) but how those words are turned into practical measures. This
Treaty article is exceedingly open-ended as to its substance, as can be seen from
the words chosen (“founded”, “respect”). Thus, when analyzing actual Treaty
provisions and legislation, it is not sufficient to note the existence of a particu-
lar Treaty provision, which seems to be just as far as most analyses made in the
field of European law reached. One needs to look further. Are the clauses actu-
ally detailed enough to indicate substantive policies? Nevertheless, what really
makes the EU’s situation sad is that from a practical perspective turning words
like ‘liberty’ or ‘democracy’ into substantive policies would often require meas-
ures that the current EU does not have competence to take. Its commitments thus
necessarily need to remain empty.
Therefore, abstraction was again relevant. As I noted earlier, and especially
in “A European Approach to Human Rights?”, rights appear in indeterminate lan-
guage: the abstract formulation of rights leaves open how they should be imple-
mented in practice. This is most evident in regard to social and economic rights
that speak the language of welfare, adequate conditions of living, and so on. But
also core civil and political rights, such as ‘freedom of speech’ or ‘human dig-
nity’ only seemed to receive meaning in their proper context through political
values and processes. Conflicting views about the permissibility of abortion, eu-
thanasia, or the death penalty, involved strongly argued moral-political claims
about what was meant by the ‘right to life’. Even though the human rights cul-
ture in all Member States referred to the European Convention on Human Rights,
the understandings of the relevant rights differed among them. This seemed to
imply that there was little independent or automatic about rights. Everything
seemed to depend on whoever was in the position to decide how rights should
be interpreted in particular cases. Even the judge turned from neutral arbitrator
to making political choices, typically when balancing between different rights-
claims. “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go” and “When Every Picture Tells a Story”
strengthened the impression that human rights were seldom ‘automatically’ real-
ized. Their implementation required divergent interpretations or priorities under
the surface of the universal language. Human rights were a policy among other
policies, aiming at advancing the special interests of those who were designed
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as the beneficiaries of the relevant right. Their meaning and contents came to be
decided in political and administrative processes. This seemed to contradict the
common assumption that human rights were different from ‘normal’ politics and
both independent and superior to them. Instead, the relationship between rights
seemed to work in two ways: Rights not only affected politics, but politics were
needed to give more specific contents to rights.143
In “When Every Picture Tells a Story” I noted that the two European Courts, the
ECJ and the European Court on Human Rights implemented the European Con-
vention on Human Rights differently. Quite often the most crucial question was
who had the power to decide; whether the ECJ or a national supreme court was to
give a meaning to a right. Thus, the abstract nature of rights underlined the com-
petence of the institution implementing the document. This indeterminacy did
not mean that the process of implementation could result in just any outcome, but
that the outcome reflected an institutional preference. The Charter was an excel-
lent example of this, as I noted in “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go”. The decision
to leave it non-binding created the outcome of shifting the power to decide from
the politicians to the European Court of Justice. In an important way, the Charter
project was secondary to issues of institutional design and competence. It was
perhaps no surprise that the outcome followed the old institutional practice that
gave the last word to the European Court of Justice.
In all papers that considered the EU’s internal dimension I noted that the pro-
tection of rights circled around one institution, the ECJ. What made analysing the
ECJ’s actions more difficult was that it tended to switch between different lan-
guages, for example between ‘we-the-defenders-of-the-peoples-of-Europe’ and
that of intergovernmentalism. Sometimes, when the Court spoke the language
of human rights, it seemed that it was actually defending the supremacy of EC
law or the priority of the functioning of the internal market. The latter was evid-
ent in the Wachauf case,144 a case brought by a German tenant farmer, who had
requested compensation for the discontinuance of milk production based on a
Community regulation. Compensation, however, presumed the consent of the
land lord. As his consent was later withdrawn, Wachauf risked loosing the com-
pensation. While the Court repeated its earlier case law on fundamental rights as
an integral part of the general principles of law, it also stated that:
The fundamental rights recognized by the Court are not absolute, however,
but must be considered in relation to their social function. Consequently,
restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those rights, in particular in the
context of a common organization of a market, provided that those restrictions
in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community
and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and
intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of those rights.145
143On this, see also Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture” in Philip Alston
et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press: 1999) 99-116, 112.
144Case 5/88, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, [1989] ECR 2609.
145Para 18.
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The Court underlined the sufficiently wide margin that the regulation left to the
national authorities.146 In this way, the functioning of the internal market became
a condition of what rights would be enjoyed there.
But the abstraction of rights also had implications for the idea of a European
community. In the EU, human rights, the ‘common European values’ are often
invoked as a commonly shared basis for the development of a true political com-
munity in Europe. But if there is no concrete political project behind such rights,
they cannot be used as definitively binding and thus policy-guiding. This is not to
say that it would be impossible to give rights more specified meanings. However,
the more concrete and policy-guiding rights become, the less universal they are.
And yet, every exclusion of someone from a particular benefit will, from some
political point of view, appear unjust and a scandal.147 Therefore, flexibility and
the abstraction of rights can also serve an important function. The institutions
need room to manoeuvre, especially in the absence of definite policies. But this,
again, highlights the discretion of these institutions – something it was the original
point of rights to delimit. In “Between Universalism and Identity” I noted that the
more indeterminate the human rights standards were, the more the Commission
(or whoever was applying the standards) had political discretion to say whether
some State did (or did not) fulfill them. On the positive side was flexibility; on
the negative side was the making of political bargains. In this way, the open-
endedness of the political enlargement criteria also limited the possibilities of
third states to claim that they had been treated unjustly. “European Universalism?”,
again, showed the extent to which the conceptions of ‘universal human rights’,
or the practical implications of the ‘right to development’, differed between the
European Union and the ACP States. In practice, however, the EU view prevailed,
because it was the actor with the economic and financial resources. As a result,
the EU could also decide on the limits of the ‘field constitution’ – but from the
perspective of the developing states, human rights could not really function as a
language of global justice when it simultaneously also enabled and even justified
the exclusion of perhaps the greatest injustices from the negotiating table as ‘not
relevant’ for the discourse.
The human rights project is built on the idea that politics are threatening, and
as such ‘bad’. This is a mistake. Everything that is ‘good’ about human rights
depends on the politics through which such rights are recognized and applied.
Instead of drawing a watertight boundary between ‘rights’ and ‘politics’ (which
is in any case impossible), it is necessary to emphasize the way in which ‘good’
politics could be enlisted for the promotion of human rights – to show how or
146According to the Court, the margin made it possible to implement the rules in a manner that
was consistent with human rights. Therefore, the rules were not automatically incompatible with
fundamental rights. Paras 21-23.
147This together with the general abstraction of rights are some of the reasons that would make it
difficult to realize the “EU human rights policy”, as envisaged by Alston and Weiler in Philip Alston
and J.H.H.Weiler, “An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union
and Human Rights” in Philip Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press:
1999) 3-66.
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when politics might actually be beneficial for the realization of human rights. As
I noted earlier, the most important function of rights consists of empowerment; of
giving the victims of human rights violations a language in which to dress their
claims.148 This empowerment is needed for political contestation of oppressive
or illegitimate regimes and practices. What makes this difficult is not knowing
which ends to prefer.149 The human rights project itself starts from an agnosti-
cism about natural ends or objective moralities. Because we cannot know, and
are unable to argue what is ‘good’, we must settle for ‘right’.150 But these essays
have demonstrated that the concept of ‘right’ is no more tangible than the idea of
‘good’ in the way that the human rights project would assume. The assumption
that rights would have automatic consequences proved untenable. Therefore, we
need politics. However:
To be political is to have to choose – and, what is worse, to have to choose
under the worst possible circumstances, when the grounds of choice are not
given a priori or by fiat or by pure knowedge (episteme¯). To be political is thus
to be free with vengeance – to be free in the unwelcome sense of being without
guiding standards or determining norms yet under an ineluctable pressure to
act, and to act with deliberation and responsibility as well.151
For Barber, politics should be a process, which transforms “moral codes, prin-
ciples, interests, private ideas, visions, and conceptions of the good” into shared
values.152 The legitimacy of these values then relies on their acceptance and trans-
formation through the democratic political process.153
My concern is not that much about politics intervening in the sphere of law,
but about the loss of a genuine process of political articulation and contestation
in the EU’s many bureaucratic activities. Often it seemed that the lack of political
dialogue was compensated by the establishment of legal ‘criteria’ – criteria that
ended up being so vague or incoherent that they in fact merely legitimated the
use of discretion by the EU institution that had the competence to ‘apply’ them.
Thus, where the advocates of the human rights project called for more ‘rights’ or
‘criteria’, I was worried about two things. First, these criteria were themselves
political – only it was not spelled out. The criteria were about the politics of EU
administration, defended, however, as if they were non-political. Thus, second,
148On this, see also PatriciaWilliams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights. Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard
University Press: 1991), esp. at 146-165.
149See Jan Klabbers, “Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law”, 14 European Journal of
International Law (2003) 299-312 at 309.
150John Rawls,ATheory of Justice (OxfordUniversity Press, 1972/1992), esp. at 446-452. Rawls builds
his theory on two principles of justice: the equal rights of all persons and the consequent addressing
of social and economic inequalities. For Rawls, the rights and liberties required by the first principle
are political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought,
freedom of the person, right to hold property and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Ibid., 60-61.
151Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age (University of California
Press: 1984/2003) 121 [emphasis omitted].
152Ibid., 156.
153Ibid.
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I started to grow concerned about the implication that these criteria would fur-
ther diminish the possibilities of thinking about the EU’s problems in a genuinely
political way – as problems to be decided through political dialogue between
protagonists that shared differing values and preferences. Only this seemed to
provide an opening towards a more democratic and legitimate system of gov-
ernment in the EU. In external relations and the enlargement process, it seemed to
me, there was much less need for fixed criteria and standards, unilaterally applied
by the EU, than for dialogue and accommodation. This vision was underlined in
“Between Universalism and Identity”, which highlighted the way in which the EU
societal model (Western, liberal market economy) was often presented as the ‘fi-
nal destination’ at which other countries should aim. This seemed to disregard
the need of bringing in the voices and preferences from those other countries so
as to ensure that the transformation would take place through a democratic pro-
cess within the third countries themselves. By the same token, the EU approach
also seemed to disregard the sense of process that is, after all, central to the idea
of human rights.154 Human rights are never implemented perfectly by any state,
which is a good reason for humbleness on everybody’s part. As Douzinas has
noted, human rights are about “not yet”, because “no right can earn me the full
recognition and love of the other and no Bill of Rights can complete the struggle
for a just society”.155 This attitude would also seem to disregard the aspect of dir-
ection and continuous development that characterise human rights, making them
“both a statement of reality, and an ever expanding set of objectives waiting to be
actualised”.156
In this process of actualisation, politics play a central role. As I argued in
“European Universalism?”, it seems impossible to use conditionality in order to
achieve societal change in a third state, and simultaneously exclude politics at
the local level. Whereas the conditionality included in a trade agreement can in
the best case serve as a push in a good direction, its main objective should be in
launching a political discussion within the third state itself:
while recourse to law, or appealing to the state to enforce the law or legis-
late new ones, will and possibly must remain an important, maybe even the
primary strategy to transform the human condition, equally important is to
evolve and popularise a social praxis, rooted in the need of the most oppressed
communities, that seek to create shared norms of civil existence.157
154For example, the EU’s main reference, the UDHR presents human rights in its Preamble as a
“common standard of achievement” that all peoples and nations “shall strive” for.
155Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 2000)
318. Therefore, “[t]he end of human rights comes when they lose their utopian end”. Ibid., 380.
156”Introduction” by the Editors in Smitu Kothari and Harsh Sethi (eds.) Rethinking Human Rights.
Challenges for theory and action (New Horizons Press and Lokayan: New York and Delhi, 1989) 1-17 at
8.
157Ibid., in which the developing state perspective is strikingly visible. While the book has a political
agenda that I do not associate myself with, the justifications for the need of politics invoked in it are
convincing.
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Kothari and Sethi, two Indian human rights proponents, argue that incorporating
human rights standards into national legislation often requires that “customs, tra-
dition and usages should be replaced by civil law as the sole and exclusive source
of right”, which then faces the challenge set by other social cohesions that also
enjoy a “social legitimacy, not in law, but in custom”.158 This underlines the role
of the nation-state and the citizen and the need for human rights policies at that
level to provide for legitimacy for those standards:
It is in such situations where a well-defined civil soceity [sic] does not exist,
where the culture, history and experiences of different communities are not
only different but at variance with each other, and where the state does not
enjoy an overriding moral authority in many spheres of social life, if not it-
self being a major perpetrator of violations, that a relevant politics of human
rights needs to be defined.159
This suggests that using human rights as a trump card by the stronger party
would go directly against the democratic objectives of local society. It is im-
portant to ensure that the political process where “values are properly identified,
weighed, and accommodated – was open to those of all viewpoints on something
approaching an equal basis”.160 Participation in the process should thus
focus not on whether this or that substantive value is unusually important
or fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either
in the political process by which values are appropriately identified and ac-
commodated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been
unduly constricted.161
Because there are no universally applicable objectives, even the contents of terms
like freedom, justice, equality or right should receive their contents through polit-
ical deliberation162 – and should not be left to administrators and bureaucrats to
settle. If “values have been named, issues identified, agendas set, and options de-
lineated, most of what is meaningful in politics has already taken place”.163 This
seems a particularly valid concern in the areas that formed the object of my study
in “Between Universalism and Identity” and “European Universalism?”.
This does not mean that expressing concern about human rights violations at
the international level is always a bad thing resulting in unfavourable outcomes.
But something we need to reflect upon and acknowledge is that the project of a
global order of law based on the idea of universal rights will be seen as a West-
ern project by others, as “a kind of cultural imperialism doing work for a more
158Ibid., 8-9.
159Ibid., 9.
160On this, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University
Press: 1980/2001) 74 [emphasis omitted], who uses this argument when analysing judgments of the
US Constitutional Court. The argument, however, seems to be equally applicable here.
161Ibid., 77.
162See Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age (University of Cali-
fornia Press: 1984/2003) 157.
163Ibid.
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traditional political imperialism”, as Kahn has stated.164 If we believe in these
values, then this acknowledgement should not stop us from speaking about hu-
man rights. However,
we should not think that framing the issue as one of international law some-
how eliminates politics or opposing claims.165
Human rights conditionalitymight have positive potential if it takes amore process-
oriented view with emphasis on interaction, encouraging informed but genuine
debates at the local level instead of dictating specific outcomes and establishing
largely imported norms and institutions – which is the form they usually tend to
take in EU policies. In this more process-oriented view dialogue has a crucial po-
sition, which simultaneously gives politics a central role. Priorities would need
to be debated by providing an opportunity for weaker parties to be heard. This
concern is equally important in both the EU’s internal and external spheres of ac-
tion. In the internal sphere, the most acute question relates to the locus of political
debates, of which the Charter was a good example. The danger is that the lack
of a political community justifies the replacing of political debates by ‘governance
by experts’. If this happens, then something more than the introduction of new
‘human rights language’ would be needed to save the Union from itself.
Update
Because some of the articles were published already for some years ago, a brief up-
dating is necessary. As for “A European Approach to Human Rights?”, some of the
insights into the future attempted in the Conclusions have already become reality
and have since then been considered in the papers that followed. Especially in-
teresting is the connection between “A European Approach to Human Rights?” and
“All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go”, with the diversity explored in the first paper
greatly showing in the difficulties in finding agreement on the contents and status
of the Charter, discussed in the second paper. The discussion on the various un-
derstandings concerning the status of economic and social rights presented in “A
European Approach to Human Rights?” also creates a nice perspective from which
to follow the debates concerning the Commission’s recent proposal for a directive
on services.166 A central theme in the discussions has been the need to protect the
‘European social model’. But based on the brief study included in the first article,
it seems somewhat difficult to see what that model might be. It is therefore no
surprise that the Member States’ reactions to the proposed directive have varied
greatly, with the UK and Ireland welcoming the idea; France and Germany fear-
ing it might lead to a reduction in wages and working conditions, and the Nordic
164Paul W. Kahn, “American Hegemony and International Law. Speaking Law to Power: Popular
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order”, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law
(Spring 2000) 1-18 at 18.
165Ibid.
166See, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the
internal market (presented by the Commission), Brussels 5 March 2004, COM(2004)2final/3.
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States discussing the proposal mainly in terms of its effects on the provision of
health and social services.167 These reactions seem to be a reflection of the vary-
ing interpretations given to economic and social rights in the Member States’ own
legal orders.
“A European Approach to Human Rights?” showed the abstract nature of the
assumption of common traditions – even though the study was conducted at a
time when the EU Member States were a much more homogenous lot than they
are today. Since the completion of the first article, the EU has actually started
placing greater emphasis on the diversity of its Member States. The Constitution,
presented to the European Council in the summer 2003, adopted in 2004 and now
subject to ratification by all Member States based on their own national constitu-
tional provisions,168 presents “United in diversity” as the new undecided motto
of the Union. This indicates a new kind of thinking, shifting the focus away from
what is believed to be ‘common’ or ‘shared’. At the same time, it represents a sim-
ilar kind of a step away from the requirement of uniformity that was discussed in
“Between Universalism and Identity” to the extent that the new focus on diversity
underlines the “variable geometry” approach that has earlier been the result of
political deadlocks (like the EMU, the Schengen acquis and the Social Protocol). As
such it is an acknowledgement that with such a large number of Member States
as there is today, in order for integration to move forward, it must sometimes be
possible to proceed without all States on board. In this way, “differentiated integ-
ration should no longer be thought of as an aberration within the EC and EU legal
order; nor as a temporary solution or a means of gradually easing all Member
States into a uniform system”, as Craig and de Búrca have argued.169 This policy
approach
clearly emphasizes the move away from the early Community focus on cent-
ralization, harmonization and unity. [. . . ] [T]his increasingly seems to rep-
resent the future direction of the European Union. Subsidiarity is emphasized
over centralization, flexibility over uniformity, and the goal of integration is
tempered by the demand for differentiation.170
But despite the new focus on diversity within the Union, the Constitution also
emphasises the effect of the Union’s common values outside its own borders:
167On this, see EU Observer, “EU leaders agree to protect Europe’s social model”, 23 March 2005; “EU går
vidare med fri tjänstehandel”, published in Dagens Nyheter on 22 March 2005.
168The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310, article I-8(3). I have explored
the Constitution in more detail in two papers, co-authored with Jan Klabbers: ”Polkupyöräilyä ja
myyräntyötä: Luonnos sopimukseksi Euroopan unionin perustuslaista”, Lakimies (7-8/2003) 1286-
1293; “Death by Constitution? The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe”, 4(12) German
Law Journal (2003) 1293-1305.
169See Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials (3rd Edition, Oxford
University Press: 2003) 41, who discuss this especially in relation to the introduction of the concept of
closer co-operation by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The concept was renamed “enhanced co-operation”
by the Treaty of Nice. For a further analysis, see ibid., 47-48.
170See Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd Edition, Oxford
University Press: 1998) 47-48.
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The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement,
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of
law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity,
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international
law.171
The diversitywithin the Union thus seems to be no problem for justifying Europe’s
old civilizing mission, discussed in “European Universalism?”, which the Constitu-
tion proudly carries on:
‘United in its diversity’, Europe offers [the peoples of Europe, PL] the best
chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and in
awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth,
the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope.172
This seems to suggest that even if flexibility has taken room from the idea of uni-
form application of rules within the Union, this is not necessarily mirrored in the
Union’s relationship with third states, just like it was not mirrored in its relation-
ship with the Applicant States, as discussed in “Between Universalism and Identity”.
Moreover, the Constitution seems to recall the language of the EU-US New
Transatlantic Agenda, which specifies that the partners are “determined to rein-
force” their “political and economic partnership as a powerful force for good in
the world”.173 The same language is used in the Union’s Security Strategy from
2003, which gives a special status to the United States:
The Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European
Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.174
It thus seems that to some extent, in relation to foreign and security actions in
general, there has recently been a change in the EU language from the reference to
the ‘universal’ towards more general ‘good’ as a justification for the policies that
it runs in relation to regions outside its own borders. The ‘good’ can as to its scope
be either narrower or wider than the ‘universal’. While the two are largely over-
lapping and the ‘universal’ is mainly ‘good’, the ‘universal’ can also include dark
sides, as was noted in “European Universalism?”. The ’good’, however, seems to
171Art III-292, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. In practice these principles are pro-
moted through building ‘partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global or-
ganisations which share the principles’ and by promoting ‘multilateral solutions to common problems,
in particular in the framework of the United Nations’.
172Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Preamble.
173The New Transatlantic Agenda, Preamble; adopted on 3 December 1995 at the EU-US Summit in
Madrid. The document can be found on the Commission website http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/.
174 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, document proposed by Javier
Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels, 12
December 2003, at 13.
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(attempt to) exclude the dark sides by definition and simultaneously avoid the cri-
ticism directed at universalism – after all, if the EU (and US) policies aim at ‘good’,
then everybody should automatically want them. In this way, the reference to the
‘good’ seems to resemble those made to ‘human rights’ and the ‘universal’, but it
stretches even further. Still, criticism cannot be avoided, and should not be, as the
recent examples of US policies in Iraq might be seen to show. In this sense, the
reference to the ‘good’ as a justification for particular policies only appears as one
made in bad faith. This recent change in the EU language is something I would
like to study further later in greater detail.
Until this day, the European Court of Justice has not referred once to the
Charter in its judgments, even though references can be found in the judgments of
the Court of First Instance,175 in the opinions of the Advocate Generals176 and the
European Ombudsman.177 Therefore, even though four years have passed since
the adoption of the Charter, it seems that what I wrote in my paper still stands. So
far, the status of the Charter has not changed, even though it has had some of the
more informal effects that were anticipated.178 As is well known, the Charter has
now been incorporated into the Constitution, however, in very ambiguous terms.
The relevant article of the Constitution goes as follows:
The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II of the Constitution.
The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the
Union’s competences as defined in the Constitution.
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute
general principles of the Union’s law.179
175See e.g. Case T-54/99 max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v. Commission of the European
Communities, ECR [2002] II-313, paras 48 and 57; Joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-
246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and Others v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, nyr, at para 137.
176See e.g. Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, nyr, para 119; Case C-353/99 P Council of the
European Union v. Heidi Hautala, Opinion of Advocate General Léger, ECR [2001] I-9565, at paras 51,
73, 78, 80-86 and 89.
177See e.g. alleged lack of service-mindedness in recruitment and the role of the right to good ad-
ministration, decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 406/2003/(PB)IJH (Confidential)
against the European Parliament, reported in the Annual Report 2003 of the European Ombudsman,
available at http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/report03/pdf/en/rap03_en.pdf at 38, site last vis-
ited on 7 January 2005.
178One of them could be the network of independent experts, which today reports, even if in a
rather informal manner, and based on a recommendation in a European parliament report, on the
implementation of the rights named in the Charter in all Member States. See http://www.europa.eu.
int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm, site last visited on 3 January 2004.
179Article I-9 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
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The first paragraph is, again, hopelessly vague. While the whole text of the
Charter is incorporated in Part II of the new Constitution, the word chosen to
define its new legal status gives little direction: While “recognise” might mean
something different from, say, “respect”, it is weaker than other legal terms such
as “is bound by” or “will create policies in order to promote” would be. On this
point (and many others), the Constitution seems to offer more work for the ECJ:
if this ambiguous wording remains, then in fact the governments leave it again to
the ECJ to decide what the status of the Charter and its effect on particular policies
is to be. The Constitution also adds a new article to the Charter which seems to
diminish its effect further:
The provisions of the Charter which contain principles may be implemen-
ted by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are imple-
menting Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be
judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling
on their legality.180
In short, celebrating the incorporation of the Charter might be premature.
As can be seen from paragraph 2, the Convention includes a provision on the
accession of the Union into the European Convention on Human Rights, which
was a matter discussed in “When Every Picture Tells a Story”. However, Protocol 32
annexed to the Constitution establishes that even after accession provisions of the
Constitution (including the Charter) can only be interpreted through the Union’s
own methods of settlement.181 So far, the Union has underlined that concerning
corresponding rights contained both in the Charter and in the ECHR, “the mean-
ing and scope of those rights shall be the same”.182 Therefore, if the agreement
on EU accession to the ECHR is based on the terms established by the Constitu-
tion, the question is whether there will be anything left for the European Court
of Human Rights to settle, or whether all human rights related questions can be
somehow linked to the Charter and thus be left for the ECJ to decide. Article I-9(2)
also seems to presume that the EU is welcome to the Council of Europe. However,
the accession of the Union to the ECHR, of course, requires accession negotiations
with the Council of Europe, making accession dependent on whatever conditions
the latter might have.183 Paragraph 3 merely codifies the earlier case law of the
180 Article II-112(5) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
181See Protocol 32 relating to article I-9(2) of the Constitution on the accession of the Union to the
European Convention on the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which includes
the EU terms and conditions of accession. Article 3 of the Protocol makes further reference to article
III-375(2) of the Constitution, which establishes that “Member States undertake not to submit dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Constitution to anymethod of settlement other than
those provided for therein”.
182See article II-112(3) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
183However, the Council of Europe has generally appeared positive to the possible accession of the
European Union. See e.g. “Council of Europe leaders welcome the signing of EU Constitution”, Press
Release of 29 October 2004, available at the Council of Europe website http://www.coe.int/. Site last
visited on 22 January 2005.
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ECJ in the same way as article 6(2) TEU does now. It would thus seem that the
status of fundamental rights in relation to the four fundamental freedoms in the
Union remains largely unchanged. The only new development is the re-definition
of the discussion of rights in the EU as questions of ‘constitutionalism’, however,
with the constrains of the previous ‘field constitution’, as described in “All Dressed
Up and Nowhere to Go”.
In “When Every Picture Tells a Story” I argued that human rights do not have
any absolute value within the Community legal order but are just one of many
factors to be taken into consideration when balancing interests. Since the writ-
ing of that article, this conclusion has received support in the judgment of the
ECJ in the case of Schmidberger.184 The case itself concerned a demonstration on
the Brenner motorway organised by an environmental group in Austria, which
resulted in the motorway being closed to traffic for almost 30 hours. The environ-
mental group had satisfied the notification requirements established by Austrian
legislation and informed the German andAustrianmotoring organisations, which
in their turn offered information on alternative routes for the day of the demon-
stration. Schmidberger was an international transport undertaking, operating six
articulated heavy goods vehicles between Italy and Germany, which failed to do
six journeys between the two countries and suffered from delays because of the
demonstration. Schmidberger claimed that the closure of the route for traffic was
a restriction of the free movement of goods and that the freedom of expression
and assembly did not justify this restriction, which made Austria liable for the
damages.
The Court started by arguing that “[i]t should be stated at the outset that
the free movement of goods is one of the fundamental principles of the Com-
munity”.185 The closure of a major motorway for 30 hours was indeed “capable of
restricting intra-Community trade in goods and must, therefore, be regarded as
constituting a measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction which is,
in principle incompatible with Community law obligations [. . . ]”.186 In this way,
the Court thus placed the exercise of fundamental rights under the same quantit-
ative restrictions test as any other measure restricting movement of goods within
the Community. The Court found that while measures that are incompatible with
human rights recognised by the Court are not acceptable,
the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, jus-
tifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under
a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement
of goods.187
In its judgment, the Court eventually found that the measures undertaken by the
Austrian authorities were justified in allowing the demonstration. What is of a
184Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich,
[2003] ECR I-5659.
185Para 51.
186Para 64.
187Para 74.
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specific interest is of course the relationship between the fundamental freedoms
and human rights and the choice of paradigm within which the discourse takes
place: the ECJ analyzed human rights in terms of a potential breach of the free
movement of goods; not, as might be expected from a case involving the determ-
ination of human rights, within the human rights paradigm. For the ECJ, the
demonstration caused a breach of articles 30 and 34 EC,188 but it could still be
justified. However, the starting point of a more human rights-oriented analysis
would have been that the implementation of human rights does not constitute
a hinder for the implementation of article 28 EC. Thus, in the Community legal
order human rights do not serve as the highest paradigm but simply as another
eventual basis for limiting the internal market rights, just like any other measure
constituting a quantitative restriction of trade.
Considering the fourth paper on enlargement, “Between Universalism and Iden-
tity”, most of the countries considered in that particular paper entered into the
Union on 1 May 2004 while Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are still waiting for
their turn. In addition, two new States have applied for EU membership. The
European Commission gave its largely positive opinion on Croatia’s member-
ship application in April 2004,189 and the European Council stipulated opening
the formal accession negotiations in March 2005 provided that Croatia cooperates
fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).190
In addition, (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia applied for member-
ship in March 2004. Moreover, in EU’s foreign policy declarations even Albania,
Bosnia Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro are mentioned as “potential
candidates”.191 So far the Commission has invoked the same “Copenhagen cri-
teria”,192 now based on articles 6(1) and 49(1) TEU,193 which will unavoidably
bring forth the same problems observed in the context of the May 2004 enlarge-
ment. However, new elements have also been added, especially the requirement
of full cooperation with the ICTY.
A positive statement on Turkey was issued by the Commission in October
2004, suggesting that negotiations with Turkey should be launched.194 This chan-
ges the setting presented in “Between Universalism and Identity” slightly. I argued
that Turkey was the only enlargement case in which human rights arguments had
188Articles 30 and 34 EC are now articles 28 and 29 EC, and they prohibit quantitative restrictions
on imports and exports, and all measures having equivalent effect between Member States.
189Communication from the Commission. Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the
European Union, Brussels, 20 April 2004, COM(2004) 257 final.
190Brussels European Council, 16-17 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 17 December 2004, 16238/04
CONCL 4, para 16. However, in March 2005 the Council failed to take an unanimous decision on
opening negotiations, which entailed that their launching was postponed until later date.
191See e.g. Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Belarus, Brussels, 27
September 2004, 12735/04 (Presse 274).
192See the Commission enlargement website on Croatia, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/see/croatia/index.htm.
193For the texts of the two articles, see, supra notes 13 and 38.
194See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Recom-
mendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession, Brussels 6 October
2004, COM (2004) 656 final.
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seemed to play a crucial role: the way they were used gave a much more decisive
role to human rights than in relation to all the other Applicant States. However,
the new statement by the Commission indicated a change in approach:
In view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings
into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the Commission con-
siders that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends
that accession negotiations be opened.
The irreversibility of the reform process, its implementation, in particular
with regard to fundamental freedoms, will need to be confirmed over a longer
period of time.195
If expecting the Commission to maintain its earlier line of human rights factors
functioning as the decisive factor in relation to Turkey’s membership of the Uni-
on,196 then its new opinion was surprising – especially as Turkey had been re-
peatedly in the news during the months preceding the adoption of the opinion
due to various human rights concerns.197 However, the regular report on Turkey
does not particularly highlight the role of human rights. Instead, it underlines
the way the Union’s economic power and the temptation provided by full mem-
bership have been used to push through political changes in Turkey. Most of the
legislative reforms reported have taken place recently and there is little evidence
of how they are actually implemented. This, of course, suggests, as in relation to
the other Applicant States earlier, a model that concentrates attention on ‘forms
and events’, correspondingly shifting emphasis away from ‘relationships and pro-
cesses’.198 For example, concerning torture, the report notes that the use of torture
has diminished but that “numerous cases of ill-treatment including torture still
continue to occur [. . . ]”.199 Moreover, the report mentions various other extremely
serious human rights problems, such as honour killings, the use of child labour
and restrictions in the exercise of minority rights, especially in relation to the Kur-
dish culture.200 The report admits that “it will take time before the spirit of the
195Ibid., 3. There is also a warning built into the Commission statement, namely that “the Commis-
sion will recommend the suspension of negotiations in the case of a serious and persistent breach of
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law on which the Union is founded.” Ibid. at 6.
196See e.g. the Commission Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, adopted on 8
November 2000, in which it confirms that in order to be eligible for accession, Turkey “must meet” the
Copenhagen criteria and thus “must have achieved ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”’
197See e.g. “EU irked by Turkish adultery law”, BBC World news 9 September, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3641026.stm; “Turkey ’fails to protect women’ ”, BBC World
news 2 June, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3768847.stm, both sites
last visited on 24 November 2004.
198On this model in relation to democracy, see Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions. Interna-
tional Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press: 2000) at 52.
199Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Recom-
mendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession, Brussels 6 October
2004, COM (2004) 656 final at 12.
200Ibid., 12-13.
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reforms is fully reflected in the attitudes of executive and judicial bodies, at all
levels throughout the country”201. In other words, there is progress, but on the
whole, the human rights situation in Turkey is not good. This seems to evidence
a shift in emphasis from the part of the Commission in the direction of the policy
implemented in relation to all other Applicant States: in the end, there seems to
be no absolute requirement of the automatic adaptation to ‘old Europe’s’ values.
Persisting human rights problems do not hinder membership in the Union. If the
Applicant State prefers its own values, these can be explained as being compatible
with those of the Union, even in cases in which the mindset of the administration
in the Applicant State seems quite different from the ‘European’ one.
Therefore, it seems that the political environment, especially relating to the
global war against terrorism, and the open support given by the US to Turkey’s
EUmembership, has now become responsive to Turkey’s wishes to join the Union.
This new political setting underlines the need of establishing closer links between
the Western world and the Arab one in order to demonstrate that the war against
terrorism is not merely about religion. As a result, the Commission statement un-
derlines Turkey’s “capacity to contribute to regional and international stability”202
and the potential of Turkey to function as an example for other countries in the
region:
Turkey is at present going through a process of radical change, including a
rapid evolution of mentalities. It is in the interest of all that the current
transformation process continues. Turkey would be an important model of a
country with a majority Muslim population adhering to such fundamental
principles as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law.203
Based on the Commission’s evaluation, in December 2004 the European Coun-
cil decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.204 But
most importantly, the introduction of these cultural, political and especially for-
eign policy reasons to consider Turkey’s membership illustrates the difficulty to
pinpoint what really is a ‘human rights consideration’. It seems undoubtedly the
case that if Turkey’s accession is effected in order to narrow the gap between the
Western and Islamic worlds, to facilitate Europe to build a global role e.g. in re-
gard to the Palestinian problem, or in general to prevent a ‘clash of civilizations’,
then that policy itself can have a positive human rights effect – even if the term
‘human rights’ is never mentioned in the process. This points to another aspect of
the need to differentiate between ‘human rights language’ and ‘human rights’. If
the former is used in order to prevent Turkey’s membership, it is not at all clear
that the latter is, in fact, advanced. Europe may use human rights language out
201Ibid., 13.
202Ibid., 4.
203Ibid.
204Brussels European Council Conclusions, Brussels 16-17 December 2004, 16238/04 CONCL 4, para
22.
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of Islamophobic reasons, and thereby diminish the potential realization of human
rights.
It is perhaps less crucial whether the deficient protection of human rights by
the Union actually results in manifest human rights violations. The matter is,
however, made more urgent by the fact that comparisons with the EU’s external
policy sphere are hard to avoid. There are at least two major questions, the first
relating to possible human rights violations by Union institutions and the second
concerning the monitoring of the human rights situation in the current Member
States – after all, the ‘Austrian example’, as explained in “Between Universalism
and Identity”, showed the risks involved in invoking article 7 TEU. Concerning
the first question, accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, as
envisaged by the Constitution, might provide some relief. Concerning the second,
there are currently plans to increase monitoring within the Union, as suggested by
the Brussels Presidency Conclusions from December 2003, in which the European
Council,
stressing the importance of human rights data collection and analysis with a
view of defining Union policy in this field, agreed to build upon the existing
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia and to extend its
mandate to make it a Human Rights Agency to that effect.205
In October 2004 the Commission adopted a Communication on the Funda-
mental Rights Agency, a document that is designed to function as a basis for pub-
lic consultations.206 The Communication seemingly struggles with the question
of the Union’s limited competence in the area and with the relationship of the
planned Agency to existing institutions dealing with the same questions in the EU
and in Europe at large. The impression one receives is that there are actually very
few, if any, activities that could be undertaken by the new Agency under the ex-
isting EU competence that are not already done by some other institution. When
it comes to gathering information, it is true that the monitoring undertaken by the
Commission is insufficient for EU needs, and that also the EU institutions would
need to be monitored by an external institution. However, there is no lack of mon-
itoring bodies outside the EU structure, such as the Council of Europe, to name
just the most obvious example. Moreover, as noted earlier, the EU Constitution
enables accession to the ECHR, which would place the EU within a much more
powerful monitoring system than the Agency would ever be – after all, according
to the Commission, the Agency would comprise a “lightweight structure in terms
of staff and budget”.207 However, it seems that in the human rights circles the
205Brussels European Council 12-13 December 2003 Presidency Conclusions, document 5381/04
dated in Brussels 5 February 2004, Annex on Conclusions of the Representatives of the Member States,
Meeting at the Head of State or Government Level in Brussels on 13 December 2003, at 27.
206Communication from the Commission. The Fundamental Rights Agency. Public consultation
document, Brussels 25 October 2004, COM (2004) 693 final. The Commission thus suggests that the
name of the Agency be changed from that envisaged by the European Council.
207Ibid., 10.
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Agency is generally welcomed as a positive development.208 However, in today’s
EU, the problem is not the lack of monitoring in Europe at large, but the reluctance
of the EU to place its own actions under external scrutiny. This, of course, says
something about its interpretation of the universality of rights in Europe. Most
crucially, as I noted earlier in relation to the Charter, having more instruments
and more monitoring bodies does not automatically mean that something is actu-
ally being done. The Agency might be just another example of the increased use
of ‘human rights language’, invoked without much effect on substantive consti-
tutional or institutional arrangements.
Conclusions
In August 2004 Indonesia abolished its de facto moratorium on the death penalty
and carried out an execution in Medan. Following this, the EU (together with its
Candidate States and a number of South East European and EFTA states) adop-
ted a declaration condemning the action.209 The following month the EU issued
a new declaration in the case of Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy
Prime Minister of Malaysia, whose situation the Union has been following since
his conviction in August 2000, expressing concern about the fairness of the ju-
dicial process.210 Two weeks later the EU criticized the lack of investigation by
Belarusian authorities in relation to the possible involvement of three state offi-
cials in the disappearances and subsequent deaths of three Belarusian opposition
leaders and one journalist.211 In November 2004, the EU reacted to the sentences
given to seven opposition leaders in Azerbaijan, accused of and sentenced for or-
ganizing civil disturbances after the presidential elections in the country.212 Were
I someone sentenced to death in Indonesia, unjustly convicted in Malaysia, or an
opposition leader or a journalist in Belarus or in Azerbaijan, I would certainly
embrace the EU’s involvement in the matter. All of these (and many others) are
208See the EIUC Contribution to the Commission Consultation on the Establishment of an
EU Human Rights Agency, adopted in Venice on 5 December 2004, available at http://eiuc.
sytes.net/images/stories/pdf/eu-humanrightsagency-eiuccontribution.pdf; Amnesty International
contribution to the Commission Consultation on the Establishment of an EU Fundamental
Rights Agency, December 2004, available at http://www.amnesty-eu.org/static/documents/AI_
Contribution_Consultation_EU_Fundamental_Rights_Agency_Nov2004.pdf, both sites last visited on
5 January 2005. The former is written by a group of human rights lawyers and experts, the latter by a
human rights NGO, and they both mainly include technical recommendations for the operation of the
Agency.
209Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the death penalty in Indonesia,
Brussels 11 August 2004, 11881/04 (Presse 244).
210Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the outcome of the Appeal by
Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, Brussels, 15 September 2004, 12330/1/04 Rev 1 (Presse 259).
211Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Belarus, Brussels, 27 Septem-
ber 2004, 12735/04 (Presse 274).
212Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the sentences of seven oppos-
ition leaders in Azerbaijan, Brussels, 26 November 2004, 15322/04 (Presse 341). In its declaration, the
EU underlined the importance of the freedom of expression and the importance of a political environ-
ment that “supports pluralism, fair democratic competition and a dialogue between the parties” and
stated its readiness “to offer assistance in this respect”. Ibid., at 2.
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examples of cases in which the EU’s human rights arguments seem both well-
justified and well-placed. They are also cases in which human rights arguments
are most powerful: they are invoked in opposition to something as a part of a
largely emancipatory, or critical, enterprise. Here human rights are used so as to
enable political contestation of powerful institutions or actions.
The case studies presented here have often reflected a more critical picture
of the EU’s human rights policies. Human rights have often been used to sup-
port and legitimize policies of powerful institutions instead of expressing polit-
ical contestation or critique. The studies have reflected the difficulties involved
in attempting to solve existing political problems by simply introducing more hu-
man rights language. In “A European Approach to Human Rights?” references to
‘common values’ did not amend the fact that beneath this language, the Mem-
ber States were quite different. This diversity of human rights cultures within
the Union made it difficult to use them as a basis of integration. In “All Dressed
Up and Nowhere to Go” and “When Every Picture Tells a Story”, what was largely
at stake was the Union’s lack of legitimacy, which it tried to address through hu-
man rights language. What I tried to demonstrate, especially in “All Dressed Up
and Nowhere to Go”, was that the Union needs new thinking if it attempts to solve
its persistent problems: old tools will not give new answers. In “Between Univer-
salism and Identity” and “European Universalism?” the problem originated largely
in the past, which cast the Union and third states in unequal positions. In all of
these cases it seemed that the potential of human rights language was quite lim-
ited. The language did not appear to contribute much to the resolution of any of
the more substantive problems in the world, such as inequality between rich and
poor states, and might occasionally even provide excuses for not dealing with
problems. In the worst case, it seemed that instead of providing the oppressed
with a language for formulating their claims, references to universal human rights
could deny those in weaker positions in global politics a chance to be heard. This
was the case when these abstract legal concepts were used as a justification for not
having any discussion or dialogue.
Moreover, my thesis has underlined the importance of the role of power in
order to implement or not to implement rights. The major problem with the
old rights thinking within the EU is that it shifts decisions from the politicians
to judges or members of the European Commission; an old pattern that seems
to be continuing through new open-ended provisions in the Constitution. The
problem reaches deep into the Union itself, as the Union relies for its existence
and further development on such clauses. When negotiations are difficult to con-
clude, recourse to an ambiguous provision is often the only acceptable solution
for all parties. As a result, the EU often faces mainly bad solutions and very few
good ones: anything clearly binding is politically unachievable, but doing noth-
ing is also bad; therefore new open-ended clauses, and with them the escape of
power to the Court and the Commission. After all, blaming unpopular decisions
on these not directly elected bureaucracies involves a smaller loss of face for the
national politicians themselves. This creates the outcome that the EU itself ap-
pears as a mere technocratic exercise with all its well-known problems in regard
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to the democratic deficit and the lack of a sense of legitimacy. The criticism direc-
ted at open-ended clauses also applies to general principles, such as human rights.
Rights turn into a field of competence only as a result of institutional politics. But
while human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles all offer high ideals
and impressive objectives, their potential in controlling the process of integration
is only referential. At best, values can suggest a direction, but they cannot con-
trol political discretion or provide detailed contents for a policy; they can neither
show the goal nor the detailed route leading there. In this environment even hu-
man rights appear as little else than a part of the same exercise – even though it is
precisely this kind of atmosphere of open-ended political bargaining by reference
to utilitarian calculations that human rights language was originally designed to
tackle.
This problem does not only concern the way rights-policy is conducted among
and between European States but also relates to the relationship between the uni-
versal and Europe’s own identity, thus reaching into the very idea of universality
itself. As I found in “Between Universalism and Identity” and “European Universal-
ism?”, if human rights are universal, they cannot be used to establish a political
community with a distinct identity. The EU’s references to the universality of
rights underlined the need of dialogue with its partners. However, in general, the
dialogue between the EU and third states did not seem to affect the formulation of
their relationship much. This should be seen as encouragement for the EU to re-
think its methods of dialogue andmake it more genuine. But this requires changes
even within the Union: its internal structures need to be adjusted in order to make
it more flexible and more responsive to the possibility that sometimes dialogue
with third states does not support its own position but requires changes. This
is the condition of invoking universality, whatever its political benefits are. Oth-
erwise there is a great risk that the language of human rights merely provides a
universalist smoke-screen for contested and particular policies.213 Contrary to the
mainstream position, rights do not function as the non-political language of abso-
lutely preferential and universally accepted solutions as which they are presented
(by the EU among others). Instead, human rights require just as much, if not more,
discussion about their contents and their method of implementation as any other
part of a relationship.
This thesis started off from a certain disappointmentwith human rights. Today,
I can see that my disappointment was both founded and unfounded at the same
time. On the one hand, the gap that so puzzled the 8-year-old still remains – the
gap between promise and achievement, ideal and reality. As SusanMarks has put
it, while human rights clearly seem to make some difference, they do not make all
the difference. These
two visions, coexisting uneasily, reflect the real state of human rights: at once
213See David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”
European Human Rights Law Review (2001) 245-267, 260; Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation
through Human Rights” in Jürgen Habermas, The postnational constellation: political essays, translated,
edited, and with an introduction by Max Pensky (MIT Press: 2001) 113-129, 129.
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empowering and cruelly deceiving; at once decisive and irrelevant; at once
critical of, and apologist for, governments. [. . . ] [H]uman rights, if they are
to be worth anything, must promise a lot, even while guaranteeing little.214
As one grows older, one learns to live with injustice, and perhaps sadly so.
Inequality becomes a part of ‘the way things are’. The feeling of deep disappoint-
ment is replaced either by nonchalant cynicism or, in the better case, by a more
restrained, reflective understanding of the way human rights language is inev-
itably embedded in political choices. True, it may sometimes – perhaps often –
be used to legitimize bureaucratic practices, throw a layer of dignity over what
is a mundane process of administering things. But it may also be used as a lan-
guage of hope or aspiration; empowerment and contestation. Human rights are a
beautiful aspiration; their meaning is not exhausted by their misuse.215 But there
is fragility about human rights, a halo that is easily broken when they become
the daily routine of institutional elaboration and competition. The latter are mat-
ters of politics, and none the worse for that fact. As such, they involve debates
and compromise, the use and critique of power. If human rights are completely
meshed in that process, then their distinctiveness may be lost, their special power
gone.
And what is that power? It is the ability to give a voice to those who are not
strongly represented in the political institutions, and to remind those that are,
that however political contestation ends, its consequences will be borne by all,
and that this is the relevant perspective from which the eventual decisions should
be made.
214Susan Marks, “Nightmare and Noble Dream: The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights”,
Cambridge Law Journal (1994) 54-62 at 62.
215For a similar point, see Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights” in
Jürgen Habermas, The postnational constellation: political essays, translated, edited, and with an intro-
duction by Max Pensky (MIT Press: 2001) 113-129, 129.
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ERRATA
This is a listing of the more substantive errors found in the original articles.
Minor errors (such as typing errors) found in references have been corrected in
the bibliography.
"Universality Explored"
• At page 485, line 17: Remove the word "is".
"All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go"
• Fn 18: The date of the "Maastricht decision" should read 12.10.1993 (instead
of 12.10.193).
• Fn 57: The ECR numbers of the Hauer and the AM&S cases have switched
places. They should read: Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727 (instead of
[1982] ECR 1575) and Case 155/79AM&S [1982] ECR 1575 (instead of [1979]
ECR 3727).
• The quote (Coppel & O’Neill, fn 48) that starts from the last line of page 47
should end after the word "protection" on the second line at page 48.
• At page 49, second paragraph, line 7: Change "or" to "for".
• At page 65, last paragraph, third line from below: Change "lay" to "lie".
• At page 56: The quote (Clapham, fn 91) should start from the word "effect-
ive".
"When Every Picture Tells a Story"
• Fn 17: The ECR reference should read: [1994] ECR 3641 (instead of [1994]
ECR 3666).
• Fn 50: The case number of the International Fruit Company case should read
21-24/72 (instead of 21-14/72). The date of Council decision 94/800/EC
should be 22 December 1994 (instead of 23 December 1994).
• At page 274, last paragraph, line 3: Change "possible" to "possibility".
• At page 278, third paragraph, line 3: Change "underlies" to "underlines".
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366 Errata
• At 281, fn 86: Change "Institutional Impact" to "Constitutional Impact".
• At 283, fifth line from below: Remove the word "on".
• At 287, fourth line: Change "keeping mind" to "keeping in mind".
"Between Universalism and Identity"
• Fn 40: The case number of theNold case should read 4/73 (instead of 3/73).
• Fn 129: The OJ number of Council reg No 1/2003 should read OJ L 1/1-25
(instead of OJ L/1-25).
• At page 54, first line of the second paragraph: Change "Europe" to "European".
• At page 57, third paragraph: Remove "the importance of".
• At fn 77: Remove the sentence starting with "Turkey has had...", which is
repeated in fn 81.
• At fn 94: Change "CEES" to "CEECs".
• At page 77, line six: Change "CEESs" to "CEECs".
• At page 88, second line: Change "ECC" to "EEC".
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